The economic impact of trade openness on foreign direct investment into emerging market countries. by Gray, Gareth Essex.
i  
     UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL 
 
   
 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRADE OPENNESS ON 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INTO EMERGING 











A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
of 
Master of Economics 
 
School of Accounting, Economics and Finance 
College of Law and Management Studies 
 
 









 I .............Gareth..Gray................... declare that 
 (i) The research reported in this dissertation/thesis, except where otherwise 
indicated, is my original research. 
 
 (ii) This dissertation/thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at 
any other university. 
 
 (iii) This dissertation/thesis does not contain other persons’ data, pictures, graphs or 
other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other 
persons. 
 
 (iv) This dissertation/thesis does not contain other persons’ writing, unless specifically 
acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written 
sources have been quoted, then: 
  a) their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them 
has been referenced; 
  b) where their exact words have been used, their writing has been placed inside 
quotation marks, and referenced. 
 
(v) Where I have reproduced a publication of which I am author, co-author or editor, I 
have indicated in detail which part of the publication was actually written by 
myself alone and have fully referenced such publications. 
 
(vi) This dissertation/thesis does not contain text, graphics or tables copied and pasted 
from the Internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source being 










 I wish to express my sincere appreciation and gratitude to the following individuals, 
without whose assistance, this study would not have been possible:  
 
 Marcel Kohler 
 Dr. Claire Vermaak 
 Evan Jones 
 Atish Maharaj 
 Andrew Mackenzie 
 Dr. Paul Swanepoel 
 Thea van der Westhuizen 






















This paper addresses a central research question that will enable us to understand the 
economic impact trade openness has on FDI.  Does a government’s effort to liberalise trade, 
lead to an increase of FDI into the host country? Using a comprehensive sample of emerging 
market countries over the period 1990 to 2010, together with panel data techniques, the paper 
disaggregates total FDI inflows to empirically investigate, at a sectoral level of the economy, 
the effect trade openness has on primary, secondary and tertiary FDI inflows. The main 
findings are that liberalising trade openness in the emerging market countries leads to an 
increase in total FDI inflows, and in the secondary sector-wise FDI inflows. A 10% increase in 
the trade openness of an EMC member (i.e. lower trade barriers), resulted in an 8.43% 
increase in the total sector FDI, and a 4.01% increase in the secondary sector FDI, ceteris 
paribus. Trade liberalisation is therefore an important motive for FDI in the manufacturing 
sector of EMCs. This follows the efficiency seeking (vertical FDI) theories the export-orientated 
market seeking (horizontal FDI) theories.  
This liberalisation effort has the opposite effect in the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement region, 
where increased openness results in a strong decrease in the manufacturing sector FDI 
inflows. This suggests tariff jumping motives for FDI into this region.  
 
Keywords: foreign direct investment, trade openness, emerging market countries, panel 
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Some authors1 are of the opinion that more open markets are likely to create significant 
economic welfare gains through more efficient use of resources (static gains).  This efficient 
allocation of resources is thought to enhance long term productivity, investment and growth 
(dynamic gains). This positive environment is likely to entice foreign businesses, leading to 
increased foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows2.  This study aim’s to test the premise in the 
case of emerging market countries (EMCs), and whether being a member of a regional trade 
agreement (RTA) acts as a catalyst in this regard. 
 
1.1 Motivation for the research 
 
The motivation of this paper is to examine the economic impact of trade openness on the flow 
of FDI, with the focus on emerging market countries. Specifically, in addition to total FDI 
inflows, the paper will analyse the impact trade openness has on primary FDI, secondary FDI, 
and tertiary FDI. It is suspected that regression analysis using total FDI flows could fail to 
significantly account for the sector specific motives for FDI by multinationals3.  The author 
adheres to the opinion – as proposed by Kumar (2002) - that freeing the markets up to foreign 
competition and trade is likely to foster significant economic welfare gains through a more 
efficient allocation of resources (static gains). If resources are used more efficiently, an 
economy can expect to achieve dynamic gains, as increases in investment and productivity 
lead to long term growth.  It is likely that foreign firms will be attracted by this favourable 
economic environment, thus also raising inflows of FDI. Could this premise hold in the sample 
of emerging markets, and does it differ when each of the three sectoral FDI inflows are 
examined in turn? 
 
1.2 Value of the research 
 The emerging markets of this world have come under close inspection of late since vast 
amounts of wealth have been moving to & from these regions and from the more developed 
first world economies. Volatility is high and there will always be an added element of risk when 
trading economically with an emerging market.  
                                               
1 Kandiero & Chitiga (2003); Kumar (2002); Asiedu (2002) 
2 Kumar (2002) 
3 Massoud (2008); 
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This study aims to shed light on a scarcely covered area of research. More specifically, with 
regards to a sector-wise breakdown of FDI, It aims to show whether the host company’s 
decisions to invest abroad differ depending on whether the investment is in either: primary, 
secondary or tertiary FDI. 
 
The research findings of this paper will hopefully equip governments with the necessary 
knowledge to make informed decisions regarding the direction of their foreign trade, policy & 
investment stance. Multinational firms could use the research to select countries that best fit 
their strategies for international expansion.  
 
1.3 Research Question 
 This paper addresses a central research question that will enable us to understand the 
economic impact trade openness has on FDI.  Does a government’s effort to liberalise trade, 
by reducing barriers lead to an increase in FDI flows into the host EMC?  
 
1.4 Objectives of the paper 
 The central objective of this paper is to examine the economic link between trade openness 
and FDI. 
 
Following from this, the secondary aims are to: 
 Establish the optimal measure of economic trade openness in the context of this study 
 Separately analyse the impact of trade openness on FDI in primary commodities, 
manufactured goods, and tertiary services 
 Ascertain whether factors affecting FDI in developing countries affect emerging market 
countries differently 




1.5 Data Analysis 
 Secondary data was used from the World Bank Development Indicators and IMF statistical 
database. The data collected will be evaluated and analysed through the use of an empirical 
regression analysis. Regressions will be run on several trade openness variables to establish 
which is the most relevant in this situation.  
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Multiple regressions will then be run, separating the 36 emerging market countries from the 7 
member countries of the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), and then the FDI in primary 
sectors, manufactured goods, and finally services. 
 
 
1.6 Limitations of the Research 
 Data availability proved to be a limiting factor. While extensive data is available for total FDI, 
FDI at the disaggregated level is scant and is in need of improved collection efforts.  
When a model is constructed which incorrectly omits one or more important causal factor/s, 
an omitted variable bias may occur. It is difficult to include all the necessary variables. 
Sometimes this is due to the data availability limitations previously mentioned. Thus proxies 
are needed in an attempt to account for the unavailable data.  A bias may result when the 
model compensate for the omitted factor by over- or underestimating the effect of one of the 
other factors.  
 
This study makes use of a partial equilibrium, as opposed to the broader general equilibrium 
analysis. A partial equilibrium analysis looks at one market in isolation, while a general 
equilibrium analysis takes into account all markets simultaneously. This study is therefore 
limited in that the analysis would not consider any feedback between linked markets or inter-
industry interactions. 
 
1.7 Structure of the Paper 
 The paper is composed of five specified chapters. It is classified in such a way that it provides 
a clear picture of understanding the research topic, theoretical aspects, empirical methodology 
and analysis of data.  
 
A review of existing literature will be looked at in chapter 2.  It describes what others have 
done and hence sets a benchmark for the current analysis.  It also serves to justify the use of 
specific economic modelling techniques as can be seen in Chapter 3 and 4 of the paper.  The 
review will be broken down into four sections exploring previous views on each of the key 
elements the paper seeks to tackle, namely: FDI (What it is, and how it is classified); Openness 
to trade (measuring openness); emerging markets (what characteristics these countries 
exhibit); and finally, PTA’s (their aim and significance – with a focus on APTA). 
Chapter 3 concerns specification of the model and data definition. It is separated into three 
sections: Firstly the model used will be specified and reasons why the particular model was 
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chosen will be provided.  This section will also name the countries to be included in the study 
and the time frame to be used.  The second section of the chapter aims to define each of the 
variables to be used in the model, both dependant variables (very briefly) and independent (at 
length). Thirdly, the most appropriate trade openness variable for this study will be chosen 
using a generalised least squared (GLS) method. 
Lastly, the EMC and APTA samples will be introduced. Based on post regression tests, the 
most appropriate regression model will be selected in each case, to evaluate the results that 
follow in chapter 4.  
 
Chapter 4 attempts to answer the remaining research objectives with an empirical approach.  
Explanations and accounts of the empirical findings will be done using the models selected in 
the previous chapter. Firstly the full EMC sample will be run, using the GLS model presented 
in the previous chapter . Secondly, the APTA sample is run using fixed effects (FE) method. 
Finally, the results from the EMC and APTA regressions will be compared against each other, 
to distinguish any differences or similarities.  
Conclusions made in the 5th chapter will be drawn from the empirical findings.  Policy 
recommendations on amendments to government’s trade policy in these respective countries 
will thus be presented. Suggestions for future research are also made. 
 
This introductory chapter highlighted the whole picture of what the paper is going to look like. 
It indicated the questions to be answered as well as the specific aims of the study. This paper’s 
motive is to study the effect of openness to trade on FDI inflows, and how this differs from 
being an APTA member country, or merely one of 36 emerging market Countries outside of 
this agreement. 
 
The chapter that follows will unpack each of the keywords in turn, and examine the previous 












2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 FDI explained 
 There has been much debate surrounding the measurement of FDI, and what it comprises. 
The concern stems from the relative subjectivity of the FDI measurement, even though it is 
quantitatively derived.  It is thus necessary to try and define the concept. Current consensus 
defines FDI as an increase in the equity position of a non-resident owner (the direct investor 
in the home country), who holds greater than 10 percent of the shares of the target company 
(OECD, 2008) It can also include any loans from the home country company made to the local 
affiliate. Any outflow of capital causing an equity position less than this 10 percent figure would 
constitute a portfolio flow. Put differently, the outflow is considered FDI, when a resident in 
one economy (the direct investor) acquires a lasting interest through a cross-border 
investment in a company in another economy (the foreign company). The ‘lasting interest’, 
implies a long term (tangible) relationship between the direct investor and the host country 
foreign target, typically involving the establishment of manufacturing facilities, bank premises, 
warehouses, and other permanent or long-term organisations abroad. 
 
When a firm wishes to expand its production in a foreign economy, it has a number of options 
available to it. It may create a new establishment or investment (known as a greenfield 
investment); it could sign a joint venture; or via an acquisition of an existing company abroad 
(cross-border mergers and acquisitions). It is suggested by Siem (2009) that FDI from 
multinational corporations (MNCs) in developed countries, to developing countries is more 
commonly of the greenfield investment type. Since these advanced MNCs typically have the 
technological knowledge and know-how, they can create new companies in the less 
developed economies where this kind of technology may be scarce or lacking. When FDI is 
from a developed country to another developed country, quite often the FDI is into an already 
established company via either a joint venture, or M&A. 
 
The FDI relationship does not necessarily end once the initial direct investment transaction 
has taken place by the multinational investor, to the host country recipient of the investment. 
It includes all future transactions between them and among their affiliated companies. There 
appears to be an FDI relationship that extends beyond the original direct investor and includes 
all foreign subsidiaries and affiliates of the direct investor that are part of the “parent group”. 
Once the initial FDI is established, there are a handful of avenues whereby subsequent 
increases in FDI can occur.  The three most notable instances are: firstly, any injections of 
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additional equity capital; secondly, any reinvested earnings or profits not distributed as 
dividends by subsidiaries or repatriated to the parent group; and thirdly, various inter-firm 
claims, such as the allowance of supplier’s credit or loans, all of which constitute an FDI 
(International Monetary Fund, 2003). 
 
Now that the concept of FDI has been clarified, it is necessary to bring to attention some 
popular misconceptions regarding the subject. FDI does not imply control of the affiliate, as 
only a 10 percent “ownership” is needed to constitute an FDI transaction. This would be the 
true, only if 51 percent or greater established FDI, which is not the case. The figure of 10 
percent is more for statistical convenience. What it does imply for the direct investor, is an 
effective voice, or the potential for an effective voice, in the strategic executive decisions of 
the direct investment enterprise. 
 
FDI does not consist of a “10 percent ownership” (or more) by a group of unrelated investors 
residing in the same foreign country. It must be one investor or a related group of investors. 
Nor is FDI based on the nationality or citizenship of the direct investor; it is based on residency. 
Borrowings from unrelated parties abroad that are guaranteed by direct investors also do not 
constitute FDI. 
 
With regards to FDI positions, FDI does not cover all of the assets of the direct investment 
enterprise. It only covers that portion financed by the investor directly - or foreign subsidiaries 
and affiliates of the direct investor - that are part of the parent group. 
 
A firm is a set of assets that are “owned” (i.e. financed) by creditors and shareholders, where 
the former have a primary claim over the assets and income of the enterprise and the equity 
owners hold the remaining claims and have greater influence over management. FDI is not 
the enterprise and its assets. Instead, it is just one of the avenues of financing available to that 
enterprise. Hausmann (2000) believes that this distinction is important because many of the 
positives commonly associated with FDI are actually generated by the enterprise, not by the 
way it finances itself. Take for example, the UK firm Virgin Mobile’s entry into the South African 
telecoms market in 2006. If a foreign-owned company such as Virgin Mobile brings in new 
technology, a better management system or access to new export markets, it is Virgin Mobile 
that is bringing it, not FDI. FDI is just one of the ways in which an enterprise - such as Virgin 
Mobile - can provide finance for its expansions. 
 
The focus of FDI literature has shifted through a number of phases over the decades.  
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Phase one 
In the years following World War II, considerable growth took place in the total value of FDI, 
predominantly into the manufacturing sector and largely by U.S. and British enterprises. This 
signalled a structural shift from pre-World War 2 FDI flows, which were on a much smaller 
scale, of the extractive type, and mostly into primary commodities - raw materials resources. 
This shift brought about a change in thinking, since FDI could no longer be attributed to the 
need to secure primary resources, which were scarce or unattainable in developed countries. 
As it so happened, the majority of this FDI post-World War 2, was being directed towards 
developed countries (Ietto-Gillies, 2005). 
 
Phase two 
During this time, theory formulated around FDI was in its infancy. According to the 
conventional neoclassical explanation at the time, it was commonplace to lump FDI and all 
the types of foreign investment together as one capital flow, irrespective of its type or origin. 
The existence of FDI was motivated by the belief that capital flowed from one country to 
another in response to differences in interest rates4.  
 
These norms were put to an end in 1960 by Stephen Hymer, and his PhD thesis on FDI & 
MNEs. Hymer (1960) revolutionised economic theory, by linking FDI to industrial organization 
(the study of market imperfections). There were two main tenets to his theory in the thesis 
which are pivotal to his analysis of why companies seek foreign investment locations: Firstly, 
the concept of control, which is crucial in distinguishing between portfolio and direct 
investment, as well as to the motivational rationale behind the firm’s direct investment versus 
exporting or other internationalisation modes such as licensing. Secondly, the notion of 
structural market imperfections and the resulting market power of firms operating in 
oligopolistic markets. 
Since this departure, the literature on the subject increased substantially and took different 
directions, placing the multinational firm at the crossroads of many disciplines and of many 
debates as well. 
 
Kindleberger (1969) provided the first comprehensive review of the various theories of FDI 
along the lines expressed by Hymer. He approached the question of FDI from the standpoint 
of the perfectly competitive model of neoclassical economics by asserting that in a world of 
pure competition, FDI would not occur. When a market is operating efficiently, when no 
                                               
4 Calvet (1981, p. 48) provides an explanation for the inappropriateness of international capital theory 
in explaining FDI. He highlights its ignorance of the complexities of the international transfer of 
resources and the channels through which it takes place.  
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external economies of scale or marketing exist, when information is freely transferable, and 
there are no trade barriers or anti-competitive practices, then international trade is the only 
possible mode of foreign participation. This assertion stems from the Heckscher-Ohlin theory 
of international trade (Ohlin, 1933). Trade of goods will equalize factor prices in a world of 
factor immobility. This theory is supported by Dunning (1977). Logically, it follows that it is the 
departure from the model of perfect competition that must provide the rationale for FDI. 
It was thus a natural step for Kindleberger to later suggest that imperfect markets were the 
catalyst for the presence of FDI. He proposed the following classification: Imperfections in 
goods markets, imperfections in factor markets, economies of scale and disruptions 
authorized by government (Kinderberger, 1969). He named this the Market Imperfections 
Paradigm, in an attempt to encompass new developments in the field of FDI determinants.  
 
Phase three 
From the early 1970’s, the way FDI was studied changed once again5. In this third phase, it 
became recognised that the institution carrying out the foreign direct investment, is the core 
of theoretical explanation rather than the investment itself. A more recent paper by Buckley 
(1993) reiterates this ideology: “Explanations of international direct investment which ignore 
the role of the multinational firm are, at best, partial and, at worst, incorrect.” This phase 
became known as the theory of the firm. Other authors prior to this had put forward theories 
about the firm6, but little, if any mention was made of international production. 
 
One opinion brought about by this shift in thinking was the Internalisation theory first proposed 
by McManus (1972) and later confirmed by Buckley and Casson (1976). The basis of the 
approach is the acceptance of market imperfections as transactional in nature, as opposed to 
structural, as in Hymer’s thesis. These imperfections are costly and disruptive to the firm, thus 
should be circumvented by internalising the transactions. The Internalisation process takes 
place where a firm attempts to keep the results of research technology advancement 
(ownership-specific) to itself, while expanding the market reach and production platforms 
(location-specific) abroad.  
 
The terms ownership-specific endowments and location-specific endowments were 
introduced to the world of economic theory by Dunning (1977) in his book entitled: “Trade, 
Location of Economic Activity and the MNE: A Search for an Eclectic Approach”. An enterprise 
may possess or create its own technology and organizational skills (it may also purchase this 
                                               
5 See: McManus (McManus, 1972); Magee (1977); Buckley & Casson (1976); Agmon & Lessard (1977) 
6 See: Coase (1937) 
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from another institution, but in doing so, secures some exclusive rights of use). These skills 
would be described as ownership-specific endowments, taking the form of a legally protected 
right (a patent, brand name, or trademarks); a commercial monopoly (securing control of 
inputs necessary in the production process); or they may arise due to the technical 
characteristics or size of firms (an innovative and entrepreneurial workforce, or economies of 
scale).  
 
With regards to location-specific endowments, every country has a unique set of prices; 
quality; and productivity of labour, energy, materials, components, and semi-finished goods. 
Dunning (1977) theorised that the cheaper the location factors are, the more profitable is FDI, 
provided a constant quality and productivity of each input exists. Location theory is especially 
significant for the purpose of this paper because it is under this theory that the concept of trade 
openness falls. We shall therefore return to it later in the chapter when we address what 
previous authors have said about openness to trade. 
 
Keeping our attention on the MNC in explaining FDI, one remarkably adaptive and increasingly 
popular view is the ‘Eclectic Theory of International Production’, again, put forward by Dunning 
(1981). According to this theory, he implies that ownership-specific endowments, location-
specific endowments, internalisation theory, and industrial organisation theory all have 
something to contribute to an explanation of why firms decide to transact with foreign 
countries. The more R&D or advertising expenditures, the stronger the patent protection or 
the monopolistic returns of firms; The higher the cost differentials between countries; the 
greater the benefits of internalising the firm specific advantages rather than selling them; and 
the higher the advantages to be gained from multiple locations in different countries, the more 
significant the degree of international involvement would be. If tariffs are high in a host country, 
perhaps the country is following import substitution policies (and thus low trade openness). An 
MNC seeking to operate in this location, may circumvent the barriers through FDI in this host 
country.  
 
Dunning’s (1981) eclectic theory is, subject to much criticism in a paper by Itaki (1991). He 
argues, firstly, the conceptual futility of the ‘ownership advantage’; secondly, the inability to 
separate and distinguish between the ‘ownership advantage’ and the ‘location advantage’;7 
                                               
7 Whilst Itaki (1991) does not dispute the possible existence and even measurability of the advantage 
that consists of both the ‘ownership advantage’ and the ‘location advantage’, he does however, totally 
deny the possibility of their separate existence and measurability 
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and lastly, the theoretical ambiguity of the ‘location advantage’ (Itaki, 1991). Nonetheless, 
Dunning’s views remain the preeminent theoretical works by a majority of economists.8 
 
Figure 2.1, shows that the timing of an FDI is dependent on the size of the market and the 
costs of operating in that region. In this instance, licensing is never the favored option. What 
can be taken from this somewhat simplistic figure is that a firm should begin by exporting the 
product from the home country and continue to do so until demand for the product (market 
size) reaches a certain threshold. From this point, the firm should switch to FDI in the host 
country. 
 
Figure 2.1 The Timing of a Foreign Direct Investment 
 Adapted from: Buckley and Casson (1981) 
 
 
Firms that can truly plan, organize and control across borders, can also develop strategies to 
take advantage of differences in regulatory regimes in these respective countries. Thus the 
existence of different trade, currencies and taxation laws may, for example, provide the 
opportunity to develop location and intra-firm transfer strategies that give them the ability to 
manipulate transfer prices and therefore accrue higher profits than they would have otherwise.  
                                               
8 See: Cantwell (1988); Gastanaga (1998) 
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This opportunity to develop advantageous strategies is most prevalent with regards to labour, 
which, unlike the Multinational Corporation (MNC) that employs it, has been unable to organize 
itself across nations. This is in contrast to a large firm operating in a single country, where its 
sizeable labour force would make labour organisation and resistance much stronger. Thus, as 
Ietto-Gilles (2005) suggests, “A strategy of international location may also be a strategy of 
labour fragmentation”. 
 
The case of Hyundai motor company in 2007 is a good example of the labour fragmentation 
that comes about when operating in a global environment. The company announced plans to 
shift part of its production load from its home in South Korea to neighbouring China, after 
employees in the existing plant voted against the addition of a second shift, necessary to meet 
production demands. 
 
There are two main forms of FDI: Horizontal and Vertical (See Figure 2.2). Horizontal FDI 
occurs if the investment in a host country, by the parent firm, manufactures the same products 
or provides the same services as that parent firm does back in its home country. This 
Horizontal FDI can be export orientated or non-export orientated. It is considered export 
orientated, when the MNC is investing in the foreign affiliate, with the intention to use the host 
country as an export platform for its product. If the MNC is attempting to lower costs of selling 
its product in a particular country, it may employ a non-export orientated horizontal FDI 
strategy rather than exporting its product from its home country. Prohibitive transport costs or 
high trade barriers could warrant FDI in favour of exporting its product.    
 
Vertical FDI occurs when an enterprise, through FDI, expands its operations upstream or 
downstream in different value chains, namely, when an MNC’s subsidiaries perform value-
adding activities phase by phase in a vertical fashion in a host country. In other words, vertical 
FDI arises when an MNC fragments the production process abroad, thereby locating each 
stage of production in the foreign location where it can be performed at a lower cost. FDI is 
said to be Backward Vertical, if the parent firm invests ‘upstream’, in a foreign affiliate, to 
secure raw materials or inputs for its activity back home. ‘Backward’ refers to the location of 
the industry in the production chain. It provides inputs to the parent firm. Historically most 
backward vertical FDI has been in the resource extraction industries such as oil extraction, 
bauxite mining, tin mining and copper mining (Hill, 2001). 
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Figure 2.2 Forms of FDI expansions 
 
Adapted from: Hill (2001)  
Forward Vertical FDI occurs if the affiliate in the host country sells the output of its parent firm. 
Forward vertical FDI is less prevalent than backward vertical FDI. An example of this 
‘downstream’ investment would be a German Vehicle Manufacturer, acquiring a number of 
dealerships in Argentina, to sell its vehicles produced in Germany.  
 
FDI by industry.  
Massoud (2008) contends that FDI is not an aggregate occurrence. It should not be treated 
as a homogenous group, but rather heterogeneously. Since it has different, if not contradicting 
effects based on its sector-level distribution (whether it’s channelled into agricultural, 
manufacturing or service sectors), it requires disaggregation to be correctly analysed. 
 
We therefore follow UNCTAD’s common practice of disaggregating FDI into primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors. Each of these three sectors is explained by the business 
activity they are concerned with.  (See Table 2.1) 
Extractive Industries (Primary). Provide the ingredients or raw materials used further along the 
production chain. They remove or take out things which are already provided by nature. There 
is often a large labour requirement at this stage. For example lumberjacks, fisherman, or 
miners. Although there is still room for machinery and technology either to supplement the 
labour process, or to substitute it to some extent. 
 
Manufacturing and Construction (Secondary), takes the raw materials or components and 
adds value to them through production or processes. They make, build and assemble 
FDI




products. This can either be labour intensive, or use factory assembly lines and thus more 
technologically intensive. Most products involve several stages of production. 
 
The Tertiary sector of the economy is the service industry. The service industry is less tradable 
than the previous two. Often they provide intangible ‘goods’ by people, to people, in an effort 
to add value or fill a gap in the market. It is more people orientated. As a country increases in 
development, more of its attention shifts to the service industry.   
 
Table 2.1 FDI disaggregated at the industry level 
Primary Sector 
Agriculture  
Hunting, Fishing and Forestry 
Mining and Quarrying 
Secondary Sector 
Manufacturing 
Production and Supply of Electricity, Gas and Water 
Construction 
Tertiary Sector 
Transport, Storage and Post 
Information Transmission, Computer Services and Software 
Wholesale and Retail Trades 
Hotels and Restaurants 
Financial Intermediation and Services 
Real Estate  
Leasing and Business Services 
Scientific Research, Technical Service and 
Geologic Prospecting 
Management of Water Conservancy, Environment and 
Public Facilities 
Services to Households and Other Services 
Education 
Health, Social Security and Social Welfare 
Culture, Sports and Entertainment 
Public Management and Social Organizations 
International Organizations 
 
Others (not elsewhere classified) 
 
Adapted from: UNCTAD (2009) 
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While a wide array of variables have been proposed in the literature, this study focusses on 
trade openness as a significant factor affecting FDI inflows. More importantly, the study is only 
concerned with the economic (i.e. trade) aspect of openness, and not the social or socio-




2.2 Openness to Trade  
 
There are a handful of tools at government policy-makers disposal which they can use to 
restrict trade. They fall into either tariff barriers, or non-tariff barriers. On the Import side, a 
tariff rate can be imposed on products coming into the country. This raises the effective price 
of that foreign product to the local buyer. The tariff is also a source of income to the 
Government that imposes it (an import tax). Some developing country governments generate 
a significant portion of their annual revenue from this source.  
 
Non-tariff barriers (NTB) take many forms and disguises. The infant industry argument is often 
put forward by Governments to motivate for protecting of a particular industry. Import quotas 
are sometimes put in place to protect an industry. Import licensing requirements add a layer 
of red-tape, which aim to slow down and strictly control a particular industry’s competitive 
imports. Another NTB are Local content requirements on exports. These try to ensure that 
value is added to products before they get shipped out of the country. Extraction of minerals 
is an example. A Local (or foreign) diamond mining company may extract the resource from 
the home country’s ground and export it in its raw state to more advanced nations. These 
advanced nations would process the Diamonds, polishing and adding them to jewellery etc. 
After adding value to them, the product would be sold around the world for a much higher price 
than the original price in its raw unprocessed state. Often the home country (where the 
Diamonds were extracted from) imports these finished Jewellery products. Local content 
requirements are also a common restriction in the automotive manufacturing sector. A certain 
specified percentage of the parts required in the vehicle, must be manufactured in the home 
country. This is an attempt to maintain some of the value added in the production process.  
 
Policies that restricted trade were popular in the 1970’s (Pahariya, 2008). At the beginning of 
the 1980’s - with rising debt levels - developing countries started to shift away from import 
substitution policies, in favour of export promotion. Trying to measure or quantify this 
openness is not a definitive task. A major challenge of empirically calculating the influence of 
trade liberalisations on FDI, is how best to quantify multi-dimensional trade restrictions. 
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Various measures have been proposed and used as a proxy for trade openness. These 
measures are often separated into two broad categories: incidence-based and outcome-
based (Baldwin, 1989). 
Incidence-based measures of trade openness include average tariff rates and non-tariff barrier 
indices9. These measures try to capture trade policy by examining policy instruments.  
Outcome-based measures assess the deviation of the observed outcome, from an outcome 
without the trade barriers. It can be further broken down into two subcategories: Flow-based 
trade measures and Price-based trade measures. “Flow-based measures include trade 
intensity (the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP), structure-adjusted trade intensity (the ratio 
of trade to GDP adjusted for factors affecting trade, including location, external transport cost, 
country size, etc.), and import penetration ratio. Price-based measures include implicit tariff 
rates (the discrepancy between domestic prices and border prices on identical products), and 
the spread of the black market premium of exchange rates.” (Pritchett, 1991) and 
(Andriamananjara & Nash, 1997) 
 
Several alternative measures of Trade Openness have been listed which may be used as the 
main independent variable in the econometric analysis. In this paper’s appendix, (Table A2.1), 
12 of these different trade openness variables are regressed against each other to compare 
which is the most appropriate. The trade openness variable will be further discussed in the 
next chapter (3.2). 
 
Consider the standard model of trade, as highlighted by Faini (2004). Raising tariff barriers 
will typically deter both exports and imports. In a country with poor capital endowment, it will 
also raise the returns to capital and hence attract foreign investment. Thus trade and factor 
mobility are substitutes. Conversely, the reduction of trade barriers should stimulate trade and 
stifle factor mobility. 
 
An econometric study by Gastanaga (1998) examined the effects of a number of policies on 
FDI flows from the viewpoint of Dunning’s "eclectic theory" of foreign investment, and therefore 
the advantages of foreign ownership, host country location, and internationalisation.  Of 
particular interest were the estimates of tariff rates on FDI.  Whereas the pure cross-section 
results indicate the effect of Tariffs on FDI to be positive (Low trade openness – high FDI), in 
a time-series context, the net effect of Tariffs on FDI/GDP ratios became negative (High 
openness – high FDI). Although cross-sectionally, and in the earlier part of the sample period, 
                                               
9 Pritchett (1991) and Andriamanjara & Nash (1997) 
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tariff jumping seemed to be a determining factor for FDI, as time passed, in individual 
countries, trade liberalization became the more significant motive for FDI.  
 
Kandiero & Chitiga (2003) looked at trade openness and FDI in an African country sample. 
Where their study differs from this one is that they disaggregated their trade openness variable 
at the sector-wise level, but kept FDI as the total economy FDI inflows. They focused on 
whether trade in the primary, secondary, or tertiary sector had quantifiable changes on the 
flow of FDI into those countries.  
 
Now that the concepts of FDI and Trade Openness have been defined, as well as looking at 
how past authors view the link between the two, a third element of the paper can be introduced, 
concerning the sample of countries to be included in the dataset. It will be interesting to 
determine the net effect of Trade Openness on the FDI/GDP ratio, once the sample of EMCs 
is used. 
 
2.3 Emerging markets  
 
Emerging markets defined… 
While there is no universally accepted definition of the group of EMCs, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) uses the broadest conceivable definition in its World Economic Outlook 
(WEO), representing all non-industrialised countries10. Others define EMCs as a group of more 
advanced developing economies. However, no consensus exists among authorities on which 
countries to be included. The term further indicates a market that is not limited to economic 
strength or geographical location.  EMCs are considered to be in a transitional phase, falling 
anywhere between developing (China; South Africa) and developed (South Korea; Israel) 
status. 
 
Spurred on by the success of firms from newly industrialized countries such as South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Singapore, EMCs are shifting away from inward-oriented import substitution 
policies, toward more outward-orientated export-led growth (Kotler, Jatusripitak, & Maesincee, 
1997). Thus public policy instruments in emerging economies are increasingly geared to 
providing incentives for local firms to actively internationalise and be competitive in the global 
marketplace (Kotler, Jatusripitak, & Maesincee, 1997). 
Legislation from the U.S. Government’s Secretary of Agriculture defines an EMC as: Any 
country that: (a) Is taking steps toward developing a market oriented economy through the 
                                               
10 See WEO of September 2002, Table 1, p 12. 
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food, agriculture, or rural business sectors of the country’s economy; and (b) Can potentially 
provide a viable and significant market for U.S. agricultural commodities, or products of U.S. 
agricultural commodities. (Federal Register, 2009). They limit the classification of emerging 
markets to countries with per capita income of under $12,276 (the upper threshold at this point 
in time, on “Upper middle income” countries as stipulated by the World Bank, according to 
2010 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method).11 
 
These EMC’s are thought to provide greater potential for profit, but with greater rewards comes 
more exposed to risk and volatility from various factors. The term can be somewhat 
misleading, since it is not a mere formality that a country will emerge from "less developed" to 
"more developed"; although that is the general trend in the world. There is, however, the 
possibility of a country moving from "more developed" to "less developed". 
 
Precisely at what point does a country become an ‘emerging market’? 
In 1981, World Bank economist Antoine W. van Agtmael coined the term emerging market 
country. The term was used to define a country with low-to-middle per capita income. 
Countries falling into this classification represent about 80% of the world’s population, 
accounting for approximately 20% of the world's economies. Although quite a loose definition, 
countries whose economies fall into this category, ranging from very large (the likes of India) 
to small (island nations like the Dominican Republic), are usually considered emerging 
because they all share a common theme in their developments and reforms. 
Even though China is deemed one of the world's economic superpowers, it is included in the 
category alongside much smaller nations who may be endowed with great deal less resources, 
like Bulgaria. Since China and Bulgaria have both embarked on economic development and 
reform programs, and have begun to open up their markets and "emerge" onto the global 
scene, it is deemed acceptable to include these two contrasting countries in this category. 
 
EMCs are considered countries with high GDP growth rates. The Market must be located in a 
developing country. They are characterised as transitional, meaning there are processes in 
place that promote accountability, to ensure that the market is moving from a closed economy 
to an open market economy. Evidence of this could be seen in the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern bloc countries. The ultimate aim of EMCs is to introduce economic reform policies 
that promote sustainability, transparency and efficiency in the capital market system. 
An EMC will also reform its exchange rate system because a stable local currency allows for 
greater transparency and builds confidence in an economy, particularly when foreigners are 
                                               
11 World Bank (2010) 
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considering investing. Exchange rate reforms also reduce the need for local investors to send 
their capital abroad (capital flight). The inflation targeting policy by South Africa’s Reserve 
Bank is one such example of an EMC attempting to assure potential foreign investors that it 
is serious about creating a stable environment conducive to healthy returns on investment 
(South African Reserve Bank, 2012).  Besides the implementation of reforms, it is also highly 
likely that an EMC is receiving some foreign aid and guidance from large donor countries 
and/or world organizations such as The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
EMCs differ from less developed countries (LDCs) due to their higher potential for growth. 
However, EMCs like LDCs, often contain weak or poor quality physical infrastructures for 
example telecommunications, transportation, electricity and ports, roadways, and rail 
networks. 
 
Why are EMCs so eager to attract foreign investment, specifically FDI? In answering this, we 
turn to a country’s financial statements and figure 2.3. The Balance of Payments is a record 
of all transactions made between one particular country and all other countries over a specified 
time period. It comprises two components: the Current Account and the Capital Account.  
 










Source: Author’s own classification. 
 
As already mentioned, EMCs often have GDP growth rates well above the levels seen in least 
developing & developed countries.  To maintain this growth, large amounts of resources and 
technology are required for prolonged periods.   
 
Estimates show that 70% of world growth over the next few years will originate from EMCs, of 
which China and India should account for 40% of that growth. Adjusted for variations in 
purchasing power parity, this rise of EMCs is that much more remarkable: the IMF forecasts 
that the total GDP of EMCs could surpass that of the developed economies in 2014 (Martin, 
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2012). Economic demands of this magnitude require resources and inputs to be imported. 
This puts strain on the country’s Current Account, usually resulting in a trade deficit with its 
trading partners.  Governments in these circumstances need to keep money flowing into the 
country on the Capital Account side so as to offset the Current Account deficit and thus 
preventing the currency from depreciating in response to the high demand for foreign products 
& currency. The Capital Account comprises Portfolio income and Foreign Direct Investments.  
Portfolio income is known to be the more liquid and volatile of the two flows.  FDI in contrast 
usually has a longer timeframe for return on investment.  It is for this reason that Governments 
from all corners of the globe have been eager to capture a greater share of world FDI inflows.  
It would allow the high levels of imports relative to exports to continue and the economy to 
grow at full potential. 
 
In addition to generating relatively large multiplier effects for the economy, FDI typically 
facilitates the transfer of technology and promotes sound employment and corporate 
governance practices (Capital Markets Consultative Group, The, 2003). For example, FDI in 
the financial sector is commonly credited with raised efficiency of financial intermediation and 
the quality of supervision through importing higher prudential standards. These benefits may 
accrue either through linkages directly with local firms or via positive spillovers—that is, 
outside contractual relationships, for instance, by demonstrating to local firms, ways of 
accessing international markets.  
For foreign investors or developed country corporations, EMCs are an ideal investment or 
expansion path in respect of new resource outlets or extending business opportunities. In the 
host country, employment levels can be increased, labour and managerial skills become more 
refined, and technology accumulation, sharing and transfer can occur. In the long-run, Heakel 
(2003) believes EMC's can expect to realize increased overall production levels, raising their 
GDP and allowing the EMCs to catch up to the developed economies. 
 
Faini (2004) finds evidence of a shift in the nature of FDI, particularly toward emerging 
markets. Historically, FDI was primarily focused on production facilities in host economies, to 
cater to these markets and, advantageously, bypass any barriers to trade. As a result, a rise 
in barriers to trade (less openness) would have resulted in a subsequent increase in FDI. This 
suggests substitutability was the norm between trade and FDI. Presently, MNCs are displaying 
different investment criterion. Improvements in telecommunication and transportation 
technology allow these companies to realise substantial reductions in production costs by 
dividing up the value added chain among its subsidiaries in different locations as a function of 
factor prices. Hence, trade costs now play a very different role in this new context. No longer 
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do they encourage MNCs to invest in foreign countries with the aim of circumventing the trade 
costs and gaining better access to foreign consumers. Quite the contrary, they inevitably 
increase the costs associated with the division of the value added chain and therefore 
discourage firms from investing abroad. In other words, trade and FDI have increasingly 
become complementary. As a result, any regression in either dimension would have an 
adverse reaction on the other. In particular, increasing trade restrictions would not only 
dampen trade, but also reduce the attractiveness of MNC’s embarking on any FDI 
undertakings.  
 
There are authors who are critical of FDI being the Holy Grail for development. Hausmann 
(2000) warns against governments pursuing policies that actively target FDI, possibly at the 
expense of local investment. He believes it is inefficiencies in the market place that determine 
the initiative to seek markets outside the common borders of the company. The belief is that 
the share of FDI needs to be greater in host countries with inadequate institutions because 
these MNCs will tend to substitute for missing markets (Hausmann, 2000). It is from this logic, 
one may assume that investments flowing from developed nations into less developed ones 
are more likely to be in the form of FDI and occur via Greenfield investments. Converse to 
this, most of the investment flowing between two developed countries would be through 
portfolio flows (shorter duration), while the smaller FDI share between these developed 
nations would be in the form of mergers & acquisitions or a joint venture. 
 
Can increased economic trade openness in this selection of emerging market countries attract 
greater amounts of FDI? There are several studies in the literature, which have attempted to 
empirically test the relationship between Trade Openness and FDI flows into EMCs. Not all 
come to the same conclusions. Martens (2008), suggests these discrepancies can be 
attributed to the theoretical underpinnings, how the models’ were specified, the degree of 
disaggregation of the Trade and FDI flows, and the selection and measurement of the control 
variables.    
 
 
This brief review of the literature will separate the authors findings based on whether a positive 
or negative effect on trade openness was found. Firstly, a look at the literature with a positive 
effect: Asiedu (2002) regressed trade openness on net FDI inflow/GDP ratio. The sample used 
39 non-sub-Saharan African emerging countries, and 32 SSA countries, over a period 
from1988 to 1997. FDI and Trade were found to be compliments. The elasticity of FDI with 
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respect to Trade Openness was 0.033 for the 39 NSSA emerging countries, and 0.028 for the 
SSA sample. 
 
Markusen & Maskus (2002) tested the vertical, horizontal and knowledge capital models. They 
concluded that in developing countries, trade restrictions may be less of an incentive for 
horizontal tariff jumping investments. This suggests increasing trade openness will have less 
of a positive impact on market-seeking investments in developing countries compared to 
developed countries. Their regressions were performed on US inward and outward FDI from 
1986 to 1994, with a sample size of 36 economies (including the U.S.), resulting in 509 
observations of local transactions. 
 
Addison & Heshmati (2003) used a Fixed Effects approach to test trade openness on FDI. 
Their sample included 110 developed and emerging countries, over the period 1970 to 1999. 
They found trade openness had a positive effect on FDI, but the impact was relatively minor 
and varied by geographic location. The elasticity’s of FDI with respect to trade openness are 
0.0472 for Latin America, and 0.0333 for SSA. 
 
Nonnemberg and Cardoso de Mendonca (2004) examined 38 EMCs between 1975 and 2000. 
They concluded that trade openness impacted positively on FDI. The elasticity’s of FDI with 
respect to trade openness were 0.0113 (pooling OLS), 0.0143 (Random Effects)and 0.0160 
(Fixed Effects) for the 1975-2000 period. When the period 1985 to 2000 was used, the 
corresponding elasticity’s were 0.0115, 0.0127 and 0.0146. 
 
Faini (2004) uses a fixed effect method to test the Log of external tariff rate on inward FDI 
stock. He uses a sample of 92 emerging countries, over a period from 1981 to 2000. The 
significant coefficients of the external tariff on FDI stock are -1.23 (Trade Barriers) and -1.03 
(FDI potential). According to the author, the more prohibitive is the external tariff, the lower is 
FDI, which invalidates the tariff jumping motive and would suggests that trade and FDI are 
complementary (trade openness positively effects FDI stock). This would suggest that FDI in 
EMCs is predominantly backward vertical. In other words, after FDI is made and has increased 
the corresponding stock, foreign subsidiaries generate a sustained demand for imports of 
capital. The transportation of final or intermediate goods to the parent company (from the 
affiliate) will also increase exports. This suggests MNC’s aim to reduce their production costs 
by streamlining the value added chain and relocating abroad the portions of production of 
those intermediate goods which are too costly to manufacture in their home country. 
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Panagiotis & Konstantinos (2011) studied 36 developing countries between 1990 and 2008, 
using 8 different measures of trade openness. In the long run, they found trade openness 
contributed positively to the inflow of FDI in these developing economies. 
 
While there is numerous evidence in the literature documenting the positive impact of trade 
openness on FDI, cases where a negative influence is found are less prominent. One such 
case is in the previously mentioned 2010 paper by Walsh and Yu. Their results suggested a 
negative impact of trade openness on Primary FDI inflows. This is further evidence, that 
examining FDI at a disaggregated level matters.  
 
Kandiero and Chitiga (2003) regressed 51 African countries over 4 periods between 1980 and 
2001. Their study differs in approach from the rest in that while their dependent variables is 
total FDI, their openness variable was disaggregated into economy wide openness in the 
primary sector, openness in the secondary (manufacturing) sector, and openness in the 
tertiary (services) sector. Primary sector openness is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level but has a negative coefficient. They suggest increasing trade openness in the primary 
sector by 10%, will decrease total FDI by 0.7 percent.  
 
Another sign of increased openness is the signing of Free Trade Agreements by 
Governments, between countries. This concept is now discussed in the section that follows. 
 
2.4 Preferential Trade Agreements 
 
During the last two decades, the extraordinary surge in the number of PTA’s signed has drawn 
much attention from researchers and literature. Some suggest being in a PTA has a positive 
effect on FDI inflows.12 Medvedev (2006) highlights a number of ways in which preferential 
trade liberalisation might affect FDI flows. He confirms that both threshold effects (the actual 
signing of the agreement) and market size effects (joining a larger and faster-growing common 
market) are significant determinants of net FDI inflows, although the market size effects seem 
to be the dominant of the two.  
 
Not all trade agreements are created equal. The type of trade agreement matters.  Bilateral 
trade agreements are between two countries, and are the most popular type. Plurilateral Trade 
Agreements are all agreements that comprise more than two countries, but do not fall into the 
                                               
12 Globerman (2002); Lederman et al (2005); Medvedev (2006); Samuel (2009) 
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regional trade agreement (RTA) or inter-regional categories. Inter-regional agreements are 
those signed between two regional entities.  
 
RTAs are proving increasingly popular amongst developing countries, and despite the costs, 
provide the benefit of free trade within the boundaries of that regional group. Jaumotte (2004) 
suggests some of the benefits, including the exploitation of comparative advantage with 
partner countries, increased competition leading to greater efficiency, and an expanded 
market allowing for scale economies to be achieved. Globerman (2002) argues that FDI is 
likely to respond positively to preferential trade liberalisation regardless of whether an MNC 
has invested vertically (taking advantage of production process economies of scale) or 
horizontally (benefiting from product economies of scale) in the host country. The 
lessening/elimination of trade barriers between PTA members, reduces the costs for affiliates 
to transport intermediate and final products between one another. Thus, due to the MNCs’ 
highly integrated production structure, intra-PTA FDI is likely to respond favourably to 
preferential trade liberalisation 
 
Trade creation occurs when trade is shifted into the country that is now offering more lucrative 
trading terms. Or, as a result of the PTA, an increase in trade occurs on a previous trade route 
due to the improved trade conditions. 
Trade diversion occurs when the trade from one country gets shifted away from that country, 
and into a country with which the exporting country has a newly formed PTA with. In terms of 
RTAs, trade diversion results when trade previously imported from countries outside the 
region, is substituted for less efficient production from countries within the region. The domino 
theory proposed by Baldwin (1993) explains the proliferation of PTAs using a political economy 
model that focuses on the trade diversion costs of being excluded from a PTA. 
 
In Samuel’s (2009) empirical analysis, it was found that becoming a member of the WTO or 
maintaining membership in the organization in one year, compared to a country that is identical 
in all other aspects but is not a member of the WTO, resulted in an approximate 29% increase 
in FDI flows to that country, over an otherwise identical non-member country. He contends 
that the relationship associated with joining the WTO and a host country’s FDI inflows is far 
greater in magnitude than the relationship associated with involvement in any type of trade 
agreement or association. Consequently, one important policy recommendation he proposes, 
would be for some countries to focus more efforts towards WTO negotiations and less on 
establishing other types of trade agreements. Jaumotte (2004) who tends to share this 
viewpoint suggests that RTAs should be considered of second-best nature compared to 
multilateral free trade because of the possible impact of trade diversion. 
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RTAs could even have a worse outcome compared to before the agreement, if trade diversion 
exceeded trade creation and other benefits of RTAs. However, this risk is reduced when the 
objective of the RTA is to promote exports and lay the groundwork for more effective 
competition outside the region instead of protecting an import-substitution policy. This 
argument by Samuel holds less significance in EMCs, since almost all of those countries in 
this sample are already members of the WTO. China joined in 2001, Russia in 2012. Only 
Venezuela is not a member.   
 
More recent negotiations and their resulting PTA’s are no longer being dominated by the 
subject of merchandise trade alone. Being dubbed as the ‘third wave of regionalism’ by Adams 
et al (2003), current PTA’s have evolved, placing much more emphasis on other areas of 
integration such as investment, trade in services, setting and harmonisation of standards, 
competition disciplines, customs cooperation, intellectual property rights, and dispute 
settlement. Samuel (2009) attempts to test the hypothesis that the more economically 
integrated trade agreements are, the more investment that countries involved in those 
agreements are likely to receive. While his results are partially in line with this hypothesis, a 
more definitive answer cannot be reached, due to statistical insignificance of the variable’s 
coefficients.  
 
In a survey by the Capital Markets Consultative Group (2003)13, respondents underscored the 
importance of an established market in the host country. It was noted that FTA and RTI 
endeavours often increased demand and potential market size. Due to this, there is a need 
for greater trade integration, as evidenced in the case of EMC’s in Africa and Asia that have 
historically been relatively too small to attract market seeking FDI. The respondents also 
cautioned that the preferential treatment of certain investors and the rules of origin 
requirements under RTAs could distort the FDI flows to various EMCs and possibly increase 
their susceptibility to shocks if the source of FDI becomes too focused.  
 
To what extent, does being a member of the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement influence FDI into 
these countries? 
In this paper, The Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) was selected as a sample of 
countries involved in a Trade agreement. This agreement, signed in 1975, is a PTA that aims 
                                               
13 “The CMCG, established in July 2000 by the IMF’s management, serves as a communications 
channel with participants in a multitude of international capital markets. While the sample of private 
sector participants is relatively limited, it is quite representative of large firms having significant exposure 
to EMCs across various economic sectors and regions.” (International Monetary Fund, 2003) 
25  
at promoting intra-regional trade through exchange of mutually agreed concessions by the 
member countries. The participating countries include: Bangladesh, China, India, Republic of 
Korea (South), Lao People's Democratic Republic, and Sri Lanka. Mongolia is currently in the 
process of accession to APTA.14  
This particular trade agreement was chosen because of its successful track record. In 2011, 
FDI into APTA countries amounted to $162 billion (or 10.6% of world FDI in 2011). This is in 
stark contrast to the FDI inflows into APTA at the time it was signed in 1975. FDI inflows were 


























                                               
14 (United Nations: Economic and Social Commision for Asia and the Pacific, n.d.) See Appendix 
Table A2.2 
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3. Specification of the Model and Data Definition 
3.1 Model Specification 
 
Following the trend of previous authors, the dependent variable will be the ratio of net real FDI 
flows to real GDP.15 Since this paper’s research is interested in looking at the effects on 
disaggregated FDI flows, there will be four dependent variables, each run in turn - net real 
Total FDI to real GDP; net real primary sector FDI to real GDP; net real secondary sector FDI 
to real GDP; and net real tertiary sector FDI to real GDP.  
As indicated, the objective of this paper is not to find the factors that impact FDI flows into 
EMC’s per se. Rather, the aim is to establish whether trade openness has a significant effect 
on the FDI sectors, having controlled for any other important determinants of FDI. The 
estimated equation in this paper most closely resembles the method found in Kandiero & 
Chitago (2003). 
 
FDI = Trade openness, REER, GDP growth, P2, GDP per capita, E 
 The following equation is estimated:  
Fjit = α + β1 + β2ηit + β3Ӽit + eit……………………….(1) 
 
 where,  
α = the constant 
Fj = FDI (Economy wide, Primary Sector, Secondary Sector, and Tertiary Sector 
FDI/GDP) 
i = the ith country  
t = time period in years 
ηit = measures of openness 
eit  = error term 
Xit  = a vector of other determinants of FDI (Real Effective Exchange Rate; GDP growth 
rate; Inflation; GDP per capita). 
 
In the empirical analysis, for convenience, we log one or more of the variables to aid 
interpretation. By logging both the dependent (Y) and independent (X) variable(s), the 
regression coefficients (β) will be elasticities, and interpretation would go as follows: a 1% 
increase in X would lead to a ceteris paribus β% increase in Y (on average).  
                                               
15 Asiedu (2002); Kandiero and Chitiga (2003); Addison and Heshmati (2003); Nonnemberg (2004); 




Logging only one side of the regression "equation" would lead to alternative interpretations as 
outlined below:   
 Y and X -- a one unit increase in X would lead to a β increase/decrease in Y  
 Log Y and Log X -- a 1% increase in X would lead to a β % increase/decrease in Y  
 Log Y and X -- a one unit increase in X would lead to a β∗100 % increase/decrease in 
Y   
 Y and Log X -- a 1% increase in X would lead to a β/100 increase/decrease in Y 
 
When including the control variables: 
FDIjit = β1 + β2ηit + β3Ӽit + zit + eit ……………………….(2)  where, 
zit = each of the control variables in turn (infrastructure matrix; secondary school enrolment; tertiary school enrolment; corruption; natural resources; oil reserves; railway infrastructure)    
 
3.2 Data Definition 
3.2.1 Macroeconomic Variables 
 
 FDI 
FDI inflow, as a proportion of GDP is used as the Dependent variable in this paper. This is 
indicated by the variable: Total FDI/GDP. The data for GDP spanned a 21 year period from 
1990 to 2010, and was obtained from the World Bank 2012, WDI dataset. A constant currency 
denomination in US$ millions was used, with the base year being 2000. Sources of sectoral 
FDI data: UNCTAD WID country profiles. National Bank databases, ASEAN FDI database 
2006, OECD statistics website 2006-2010. 
 
Real FDI inflow values are used at all stages of the regressions, rather than nominal FDI 
inflows. They are calculated as follows: Real value of FDI = (Nominal value of FDI x GDP 
deflator) x 100 
Total FDI was calculated by adding the three industry sectors, plus any unspecified inflows.  
Recall in Chapter 2, Table 2.1. 
Primary FDI comprised Agriculture; Hunting & Fishing; and Mining & Quarrying.  
Secondary FDI comprised Manufacturing; Construction; and the production and supply of 
Electricity, Gas & Water. 
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Tertiary FDI was made up of Trade & Repairs; Hotels & Restaurants; Transports, Storage & 
Communication; Financial Intermediation; Real Estate, Renting & Business Activities; and 
Other Services.  
 
At all stages in this paper’s regressions, FDI flows are used rather than stocks, in order to 
improve the tracking of the variation in the data. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) suggest that 
“To the extent that inward and outward FDI have been going on for a long time, recent and 
relatively large changes in FDI behaviour may not be evident if FDI stock figures are used.” 
Therefore, as long as FDI stocks are relatively large, annual increments to these stocks are 
expected to be minimal, causing an empirical model to have difficulty identifying the 
determinants of change in the dependent variable. Additionally, they felt the methods used to 




 Openness to Trade 
It is argued by Alcala & Ciccone (2003), that real openness is a more appropriate measure of 
openness compared to current openness in the presence of trade-driven productivity gains. 
As such, data at constant prices was used in this paper for the openness variables. The data 
was obtained from the World Bank 2012, WDI dataset. 
In Chapter 2, Appendix Table A2.1 showed a range of trade openness variables proposed or 
suggested in previous literature to show trade openness’ influence on FDI. Each of those 
suggested trade openness variables were run in turn on FDI in total, and broken down by 
industry. This is to determine the most appropriate trade openness variable to use in the 
proposed empirical analysis. The trade openness regressions can be found in the appendix 
(Table A3.4 to A3.7). 
 
If the simple trade intensity variable is used (X+M)/GDP, one would expect a positive sign 
between trade openness and FDI/GDP. If (X+M)/GDP increases, it is probably because of a 
liberalising trade regime, thus increased openness. This would suggest complementarity 
exists between trade openness and FDI inflows.  However, if a tariffs variable is used in this 
instance, one would expect a negative sign between trade openness and FDI/GDP. As tariffs 
decrease, there would be an anticipated increase in FDI. 
 
Which is the best Trade Openness variable to use as a proxy? The simple trade intensity 
variable “ln_TradeR4” (column 6) was chosen as the most appropriate of the alternate 
variables, to approximate trade openness. Representing (X+M)/GDP, It is one of the most 
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commonly used outcomes-based measures in the literature16. It allows for the highest number 
of observations available in the samples, and displays robust regression results in this sample. 
17 
 
The expected sign of total sectoral FDI as a proportion of GDP could be either negative or 
positive. It would depend on which FDI sector has the biggest influence on total FDI inflows.  
Trade openness may not have too much influence on primary FDI. This type of FDI is of the 
extractive type, and investment in this sector tends to ignore macro-economic variables (Faini, 
2004). There could be a positive sign, if the reason from this investment is to export the 
extracted resources to external markets. Resource seeking FDI supplements trade but is less 
sensitive to trade barriers in host countries.  
 
Regarding secondary FDI, if the investment in the manufacturing and construction sector is of 
the efficiency seeking (Vertical type), one might expect a positive sign between trade 
openness and secondary FDI. The aim is simple, namely to cut production costs by dividing 
the value-added chain and relocating abroad the production of those intermediate goods 
which are too costly to produce domestically. The MNC’s might try to take advantage of factor 
endowments in less developed countries. Labour costs are often lower relative to more 
advanced nations. Vertical FDI is also thought to be trade creating, but is highly responsive to 
trade barriers. Siem (2009) finds trade barriers discourage vertical FDI, and therefore a 
positive effect of trade openness on this type of FDI.  
 
If the host country’s secondary sector FDI is horizontal in nature (that is, the MNC’s producing 
a product replicating its home country industry), the expected effect of trade openness and 
secondary FDI is more complicated. FDI of the horizontal type may be positively or negatively 
affected by trade openness. According to Siem (2009), the expected sign is dependent on 
whether the MNC is planning to export that product it produces in the host country to 
neighbouring countries, or whether it plans to only serve that host country’s market. Theory 
suggests export-orientated FDI is positively influenced by how open that host country is, while 
non-export orientated investments are negatively affected by increased trade openness. 
Sometimes, an MNCs production is shifted to a foreign location, motivated by the desire to 
avoid trade barriers, reduce transport costs and gain access to foreign consumers. This is 
                                               
16  Benassy-Quere, Fontagne, & Lareche-Revil (2001); Asiedu (2002); Kandiero & Chitiga (2003); 
Addison & Heshmati (2003); Nonnemberg & Cardoso de Mendonça (2004); Ghosh (2007) 
17 Of the EMC’s, data for Nigeria’s real exports was unavailable. The observations for this country 
were obtained by deflating its Nominal Exports by the GDP deflator for the respective period. 
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known as the Tariff-jumping motive. Gastanaga et al (1998) suggests a negative sign is 
expected between trade openness and FDI in this instance.  
Gelb (2005) argues that the resource seeking motive for FDI is not reserved for the primary 
sector, extractive industries such as mining or agriculture. It can also be said to incorporate 
secondary sector FDI in its quest for cheap labour as a resource. Resmini (2000), who studied 
manufacturing investment in Central and Eastern Europe, found predominantly vertical FDI 
inflows, which benefited from increased openness, as one might expect in a sector for which 
international trade flows in intermediate and capital goods are important. Singh and Jun (1996) 
also find that export orientation is very important in enticing FDI, suggesting the rising 
complementarity between trade and FDI flows as an explanation. 
 
Regarding the Tertiary sector, most services FDI is likely to be of a horizontal nature (non-
export), aimed at the host country market in which the investment is made, rather than vertical 
(intended for export back to the home market). It is often difficult to export a service. 
Sometimes the service rendered offers an intangible benefit. As a result, it has little to do with 
trade flows per se. In their paper, Walsh and Yu (2010) were surprised to find a strong positive 
coefficient of Trade Openness on Tertiary FDI inflows. In defence of their findings, they 
suggested trade liberalisation may be correlated with the type of economic liberalisation that 
also generates a sound economic environment, conducive to the service industry. 
 
 REER (ln_REER2) 
Real Effective Exchange Rate is the nominal effective exchange rate (a measure of the value 
of a currency against a weighted average of several foreign currencies) divided by a price 
deflator or index of costs. The base year used was 2000 = 100. The data was obtained from 
Bruegel “A New Database” (2012), as well as own calculations.  
 
It is generally accepted in the literature that the REER in the host country (The country 
receiving the FDI), is negatively associated with FDI flows into the economy. 18 A weaker real 
exchange rate might be expected to increase vertical FDI as firms take advantage of the 
relatively lower prices in host markets to purchase facilities or, if production is re-exported, to 
increase home-country profits on goods sent to a third market. Froot and Stein (1991) find 
evidence of this relationship: a weaker host country currency tends to increase inward FDI 
within an imperfect capital market model as depreciation makes host country assets cheaper 
relative to assets in the home country. Blonigen (1997) makes a “firm specific asset” argument 
                                               
18 Froot & Stein (1991); Blonigen (1997); Bende-Nabende (2002); Kandiero & Chitiga (2003); Cuyvers, 
Plasmans, Soeng, & Van den Bulcke (2008); Walsh & Yu (2010) 
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to show that depreciating exchange rates in host countries relative to the rest of the world tend 
to result in increased FDI inflows. 
 
 GDP growth rate (rGDPgrow) 
Using the GDP growth rate of a country controls for future market potential. MNC’s look to 
invest in countries experiencing higher economic growth. During times of higher economic 
growth in an economy, local opposition to FDI in the host country may be less hostile to a 
proposed FDI inflow. Similar to Addison and Heshmati (2003), one would expect the growth 
rate of GDP variable to be positively related to FDI inflows. Many empirical studies use the 
rate of growth of GDP, as a proxy for the growth of market size.19 Data source: World Bank’s 
WDI 2012. Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local 
currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. 
 
 Inflation (P2) 
An Inflation variable is said to be an adequate proxy for macro-economic stability in a country 
(Ghosh, 2007). We follow the World Bank’s WDI 2012 definition of inflation, measured by the 
consumer price index (CPI). It measures the annual average percentage change in the price 
paid by an urban consumer for a fixed basket of goods and services. The Laspeyres formula 
was used. 
 
 Log GDP per capita (ln_rGDPpc)  
Kandiero (2003) uses GDP per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted, as a proxy 
accounting for market size.  
In this paper, the researcher uses the natural log of GDP per capita. GDP per capita is gross 
domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the total value of all final goods and 
services produced annually within the borders of a country, plus any product taxes and minus 
any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. The data was sourced from the World Bank’s national accounts WDI. 
 
3.2.2 Control Variables 
 In the second part of the regression analysis, after specifying the macroeconomic variables, 
we include institutional and qualitative variables, which we label as our control variables. 
                                               
19 see Knickerbocker (1973); Root and Ahmed (1979); Lim (1983); Torrisi (1985); Singh and Jun (1996); 
Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova (1998); and Ryckeghem (1998) 
32  
These include an infrastructure index, secondary school enrolment, tertiary school enrolment, 
corruption, a total natural resource index, an oil reserve dummy, and a telecommunication 
infrastructure variable. Due to the potential multicollinearity between these control variables, 
this method of separating the macroeconomic variables from the institutional/qualitative 
control variables, and adding each into the regression in turn, is deemed appropriate, and 
follows the method found in Walsh and Yu (2010).  
 
 Infrastructure Index (Rail + Telephone) (ln_InfraISum2Mis) 
An more extensive infrastructure increases the productivity of investments and therefore 
stimulates FDI flows. Asiedu (2002) believes a comprehensive measure of infrastructure 
development should account for both the availability and reliability of infrastructure. Though 
due to data constraints, she ignores the reliability of infrastructure.  
 
This paper follows the method of Asiedu (2002), by only accounting for the availability aspect. 
An infrastructure index was attempted, to capture a more holistic view of the different 
infrastructural facilities. At first, four variables were tested in the index: Rail lines, road density, 
telephone lines, and internet subscribers. Eventually road density and internet subscribers 
were dropped from the index, due to insufficient observations and poor model specification.  
Rail lines is the length of total railway route in kilometers available for train services, 
irrespective of the number of parallel tracks. The data was obtained from the WDI 2012 
database and the CIA World Factbook. The data for Telephone lines per 100 people was re-
scaled from 100 to 10,000 people. This was to limit the negative observations that resulted 
when their log values were calculated. 
 
 Human Capital (Educ2nd; EducTer) 
Education raises the productivity of FDI, leading to higher growth in the host country. The 
higher the level of education, the greater the potential for an investment decision, and 
achievement of an expected outcome. However, skill-biased technological change indicates 
that a part of the production from industrialised economies is increasingly being shifted or 
outsourced to less developed countries. In the latter case, the expected positive association 
between human capital and FDI is reversed (Addison & Heshmati, 2003). Two variables were 
included in the paper to capture the human capital in the sample countries. 
Secondary education enrollment ratio (Educ2nd), acts as a proxy for the level of human 
capital, specifically semi-skilled labour. Tertiary enrollment ratio, as measured by the EducTer 
variable, aims to capture the level of skilled labour in the country. The data was sourced from 
the WDI 2012 database. 
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In recent years, MNC’s have been offshoring20 professional services and technology-related 
facilities, for which a well-educated pool of workers is essential (Lluberas, 2007). 
 
 
 Corruption/Political instability Index (Corrupt) 
A corruption index is used as a proxy for how corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to 
be. The Corruption Perception Index produced by Transparency International is used. It is 
based on 13 independent surveys, giving countries a score from 10 (being highly clean) to 0 
(highly corrupt). The study covers the period 2001-2010. In the most recent publication, 
amongst the EMC sample, Chile scored the highest, with a score of 7.2 out of 10. At the bottom 
end of the clean sheet, Venezuela only managed a score of 2.0, followed closely by Russia 
with 2.1 out of 10.   
 
One would expect a positive relationship between the index and FDI. This implies that a 
country with a lower corruption index score (more corrupt public sector), would attract a lower 
share of FDI inflows.   
 
 Natural Resources Index (NatResTotExProt) 
The data was obtained from the World Bank’s “Wealth of the Nations 2011” publication. They 
calculate a natural capital variable, which is the sum of pasture land, crops, timber, non-timber 
forest, oil, protected areas, coal, natural gas and minerals.  
 
Protected areas were subtracted from the calculation. Since protected areas are owned by 
the governments of the respective countries, they won’t be available for commercial use, and 
therefore not of value to MNC’s looking to invest. A positive effect is expected from the 
presence of natural resources on the inflow of FDI (Addison & Heshmati, 2003). 
 
 Oil Reserve dummy (OilResDum) 
Oil-reserve dummy, OilRes = 1 if country has oil reserves greater than 400 million bbl. 
OilRes = 0 if its oil reserves are less than or equal to 400 million bbl.21  
Loots (2002) established that this variable is necessary to determine the appeal of oil endowed 
countries in attracting more FDI. Further, it served as a control for countries whose economies 
may be primarily based on this natural resource. The data was obtained from the CIA World 
Factbook (2012). This source lists the stock of proven reserves of crude oil in barrels (bbl). 
                                               
20 Offshoring is the relocation of a business process from a company in one country, to the same or 
another company in another, different country. 
21 The "bbl" abbreviation is used to signify a petroleum barrel of 159 liters. 
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Proven reserves are those quantities of petroleum which, by analysis of geological and 
engineering data, can be estimated with a high degree of confidence to be commercially 
recoverable in the foreseeable future, from known reservoirs and under the prevailing 
economic climate. Theory suggests a positive effect of the oil reserve dummy on FDI inflows 
is expected (Loots, 2002). 
 
 Infrastructure (Telephone lines) (ln_InfraT) 
Similar to the Infrastructure index, except this variable is not an index, but comprises one 
variable. The natural log of telephone lines per 10,000 people. It should take into consideration 
the extent of telecommunications available in a country. The researcher can anticipate a 
positive relationship between ln_InfraT and FDI. Perhaps more significantly in the tertiary 
sector.  
 
International cross-sectional studies account for the vast majority of available data studies on 
the effect of policy-related variables on FDI flows (Gastanaga, Nugent, & Pashamova, 1998). 
Yet, despite attempts to separate out other influences, as with all cross-section studies, the 
results may reflect other non-measurable influences which vary across countries but not over 
time. For this reason, the results of such studies may not apply to the more relevant trade 
policy reform context of changes over time. Dollar and Kraay (2001) contend that a large part 
of the cross-country difference in countries' trade/GDP share has little to do with policy, but 
rather reflects countries' characteristics specific to their location. It is difficult to attribute 
discrepancies in trade volumes amongst countries as a reflection of significant trade policy 
differences. 
 
Therefore, it would seem important that the cross-sectional estimates be supplemented with 
time-series data. The main drawback to embarking on a time-series study is the absence of 
time-series of sufficient length and variation over time on the relevant policy variables to allow 
the effects of such changes on FDI to be accurately estimated. For example, in many countries 
corporate tax rates, tariff rates, regulations on capital flows, and various other institutional 
factors remain unchanged for many years for reasons of international treaty, political 
equilibrium, policy gridlock among other factors. Developed countries governments have been 
collecting statistics and economic data for decades, but often less developed countries and 
newly EMC’s have less complete economic statistical records in place. Some strides toward 
improving this problem have been made by organisations such as the World Bank (WDI) and 
UNCTAD (UNCTAD STAT) databases. Another problem with pure time-series analysis of FDI 
is that the variations over time may be quite volatile, reflecting many idiosyncratic influences 
unique to an individual economy. For example, while one country might be experiencing civil 
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unrest and therefore foreign investment scared away, another nearby country might be 
booming, with high GDP annual growth rates and multinationals scrambling to set up shop 
within its borders. 
 
In order to alleviate the drawbacks arising from either pure cross-section or pure time-series 
analyses, by using data over time, and across countries, this paper makes use of Panel Data 
estimation techniques to estimate the policy influences. The panel data approach allows for a 
more systematic distinction between the effects of policy changes, and other less variable 
elements of the investment climate on FDI. 
 
When deciding on which countries to include in the sample of emerging markets, a number of 
well-regarded sources where utilised.  
- IMF FDI emerging markets  
- Countries with cities included in the EMI, compiled by Mastercard (2008) 
- The Economist 
- Emerging market Global Players (EMGP) project at Columbia University (2014) 
The analysis began with a pool of 43 potential EMC’s, but, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago 
were dropped due to the lack of data available for constant prices. They are also small island 
nations. “They are frequently used as off-shore banking centers and their level of de facto 
openness to financial flows is radically different from other countries with similar income level.” 
(Aizenman & Noy, 2005). Panama was dropped as most of its FDI inflows were due to tax 
avoidance, going into pure holding companies to take advantage of the country’s favourable 
taxes breaks. Uruguay, Philippines, Jordan and Israel were also dropped as no FDI data was 
available at the sector-wise level. (See Appendix A1, for a list of EMCs in the sample). 
 
As mentioned previously (in chapter 2.3), as an upper threshold, EMC’s are limited to Upper 
Middle Income countries and below this category. Countries such as South Korea and Israel 
had GNI per capita exceeding this 2010 threshold and were thus removed from the sample. 
They are examples of EMC’s that have risen above this label and progressed sufficiently in 
economic terms to be considered Developed. 
After dropping these countries, the data analysis was left with 35 EMC’s in the sample over a 
21 year period from 1990-2010. 
 
Regarding the smaller subset for the Asia-Pacific trade agreement countries, the analysis will 
cover 5 of the 6 countries over the 21 year period. Sri Lanka was dropped due to the lack of 
FDI data at the sector-wise level. Each of the APTA member countries joined the trade 
agreement at its inception, in 1975 (with the exception of China, which was acceded in 2001). 
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Including a dummy for the date member countries joined APTA is unlikely to have a significant 
effect on the results. This is due to the members joining the PTA fifteen year prior to the sample 
period in this paper.  
 
3.3 The Econometric models available for estimation: 
 
OLS 
In the application of regression analysis, the possible existence of heteroscedasticity is a major 
concern, including in the analysis of variance. The presence of heteroscedasticity can 
invalidate statistical tests of significance that assume that the modeling errors are 
uncorrelated, normally distributed, and that their variances do not vary with the effects being 
modelled. Gujarati and Porter (2009). 
Heteroscedasticity can cause ordinary least squares estimates of the variance - and thus, 
standard errors - of the coefficients to be biased, possibly above or below the true  population 
variance. Thus, regression analysis using heteroscedastic data will still provide an unbiased 
estimate for the relationship between the predictor variable and the outcome, but standard 
errors and therefore inferences obtained from data analysis are questionable. Biased standard 
errors lead to biased inference, so results of hypothesis tests are possibly wrong. 
 
The presence of heteroscedasticity can be tested in the OLS model using the Breusch-Pagan 
/ Cook-Weisberg test. It tests the null hypothesis that the error variances are all equal versus 
the alternative that the error variances are a multiplicative function of one or more variables.  
A large Chi-squared test result would mean heteroscedasticity was a factor. 
 With a large number of parameters to estimate, multicollinearity can be an anticipated 
problem. A simple test of its degree can be obtained by regressing each of the independent 
variables on the remaining independent variables. The R2 obtained can then be taken as a 
measure of the degree of multicollinearity. 
Previous literary works on the subject - which use OLS estimation methods - include Asiedu 
(2002); Alfaro (2003); Jensen (2003); and Siem (2009) among others. 
 
FE 
The pooled OLS does not account for any unobservable country-specific effects and is 
therefore a less appropriate estimator of the parameters of the FDI model. Pooled OLS is used 
as a starting point. The model is next estimated by allowing country effects to control for 
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unobservable policy and technology effects. This method is known as the Fixed Effects 
method. There may be some unobserved within country effects that need to be accounted for. 
For example, the political system of a particular country in the sample could have some effect 
on trade flows. FE’s remove the effect of those time-invariant characteristics from the predictor 
variables, so we can assess the predictors’ net effect. 
Previous literature on the subject, which make use of FE’s include Gastanaga (1998), Asiedu 
& Lien (2004)22, and Asiedu (2005). 
 
A problem with FE estimation is that it not only removes any within country effects, but also 
eliminates all time-indifferent variables. It is appropriate only when the research is interested 
in analysing the impact of variables that vary over time.  
The usual Goodness-of-fit R2 is valid for comparison of the pooled model estimated by OLS 
and the FE model. FE assumes that each country’s error term and constant should not be 
correlated with the others. If the error terms are correlated, then FE is not suitable since 
inferences may not be correct. This is the main rationale for the Hausman test. 
 
RE 
The random effects estimator is a weighted average of the estimates produced by between 
and the within effects (FE). This is a form of Weighted Least Squares when correlation is 
uniform. An advantage of RE is that it allows for time invariant variables (e.g. Oil reserve 
dummy). In the FE model, these variables are absorbed by the intercept. 
 
The Hausman test, shows whether country specific effects are correlated with the explanatory 
variables. Thus it is a test between RE and FE. The null hypothesis is that the coefficients 
estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the 
consistent fixed effects estimator (Green, 2008). 
 
If they are (insignificant Chi-squared, probability greater than Chi-squared larger than 0.5), 
then it is safe to use random effects over fixed effects. Otherwise, you should use FE, or one 
of the other solutions for unobserved heterogeneity (McMahon, 2012). We then run a Breusch 
and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test to decide between a RE regression and a simple OLS 
regression.  The command xttest0 is used in Stata. The null hypothesis in the LM test is that 




                                               
22 They use FE’s to estimate how Capital Controls affect FDI inflows. 
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GLS 
The Stata command xtgls allows a more flexible covariance structure for disturbances and 
random effects (Biørn, 2010). xtgls is more commonly used for panel data. It fits these cross-
sectional time-series linear models using feasible generalized least squares. This command 
allows estimation in the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional 
correlation  and/or heteroskedasticity across panels. GLS minimizes a weighted sum of 
squared residuals. In the case of heteroscedasticity, observations expected to have error 
terms with higher variances are weighted less than observations suspected to have error 
terms with smaller variances. Previous literature on the subject (which also makes use of 
GLS), includes Karim et al (2003), and Medvedev (2006), among others. 
 
GMM 
GMM is designed for a dynamic persistent panel data with few time periods and many 
individuals, with endogenous regressors, with fixed effect, with heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation within cross-sections. 
Having run the regression using the GMM model, the researcher believes it is an 
inappropriate method for this data set. Though recently, numerous studies in the literature 
have based their econometric findings on this method.23  
Roodman (2006) states: “If N is small, the cluster-robust standard errors and the Arellano-
Bond autocorrelation test may be unreliable. The test depends on the assumption that N is 
large. Large has no precise definition, but applying it to panels with N = 20, for instance, seems 
worrisome.”  
While the 35 EMC’s in this paper may just be a sufficient number for GMM estimation, the 











                                               
23 Kandiero & Chitiga (2003); Stoianov (2007); Tondl & Fornero (2008); and Solomon (2011) 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Which econometric model to use for estimation of the regressions? 
Prior to running the regressions, the most appropriate econometric model needs to be 
selected. The effects of macroeconomic variables on total sector FDI will now be considered 
(As shown in table 4.1.1). The dependent variable is total sector FDI. The independent 
variables are openness, log of REER, real GDP growth rate, Inflation, and log of GDP per 
capita. 
 
Table 4.1.1 EMC Total Sector FDI model selection, Macroeconomic Variables. 
(OLS,FE,RE,GLS). Uncorrected 
Total Sector-wise FDI 1990-2010     
   1 2 3 4 
Model Selection  OLS FE RE GLS 
Independent Variables     
       
       
openness ln_TradeR4 0.853*** 0.805 0.874* 0.853*** 
   (0.326) (1.458) (0.501) (0.323) 
log REER2  0.485 0.293 0.347 0.485 
   (0.677) (0.860) (0.753) (0.671) 
real GDP growth  0.00793 0.0467 0.0364 0.00793 
   (0.0390) (0.0367) (0.0355) (0.0386) 
P2  -0.00377 0.00516 0.00186 -0.00377 
   (0.0110) (0.0135) (0.0121) (0.0109) 
Log GDP per capita  -0.0477 -0.0521 0.104 -0.0477 
   (0.182) (1.700) (0.322) (0.181) 
       
Constant  -2.069 -1.212 -2.901 -2.069 
   (3.478) (10.42) (4.359) (3.445) 
       
F   2.57 0.51 5.85   
Prob>F  0.0268 0.7657 0.3210  
Wald Chi2      11.31 
Prob > Chi2     0.0455 
R 2  0.0401 0.329 0.270  
N  314 314 314 314 
i   35 35 35 35 
Source: Author’s own calculations  
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EMC 
There are 314 observations over the 21 year period. The reason for the reduced number of 
observations than might be expected, is that the FDI data at sector wise level was missing 
values from a number of years and a number of countries. Capturing this data is a work in 
progress, upon which statistical databanks such as the World Bank are laying the foundations 
for countries to follow. The table (4.1.1) compares the regression results using the common 
regression models in the literature, where column 1 depicts the Ordinary Least Squares 
method (OLS), column 2 is Fixed Effects (FE), column 3 is Random Effects (RE), and column 
4 is Generalised Least Squares (GLS). 
 
 OLS  
The Trade Openness variable is Significant and positive. None of the other Macroeconomic 
variables are significant when regressed on total FDI.  
Using the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for total FDI using OLS (1), the Chi-Squared 
value is 1.64 (Table 4.1.2). This low value suggests heteroscedasticity is not a problem in the 
aggregate FDI regression.24  
  Table 4.1.2 Total FDI Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for Heteroscedasticity (estat hettest) 
estat hettest 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity chi2(1) Prob > chi2 < 0.05% reject Hetero-scedaticity  
1 total FDI 1.64 0.2007 no no 
2 primary FDI 9.19 0.0024 yes yes 
3 secondary FDI 39.26 0.0000 yes yes 
4 tertiary FDI 26.81 0.0000 yes yes 
Source: Author’s own calculations  
 FE  
None of the macroeconomic variables appear significant using FE. The F-stat is very low, and 
the probability of being greater than F is very high.  The FE model appears to be a poor choice 
of model for the EMC sample.   
 
To test for any heteroscedasticity in the FE model, a Modified Wald test is run on total FDI 
inflows. The results are displayed in Table 4.1.3. There is significant evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity.  This shows evidence of heteroscedasticity using the FE 
model. 
                                               
24 When running the test on primary, secondary, and tertiary FDI sectors, heteroscedasticity was 
present in each regression.  
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Table 4.1.3 Total FDI, Modified Wald test for heteroscedasticity (xttest3) 
xttest3 modified Wald test   chi2(34) Prob > chi2 
< 0.05% 
reject Heteroskedasticity  
1 total FDI  1.70E+05 0.0000 yes yes 
2 primary FDI 3.80E+06 0.0000 yes yes 
3 secondary FDI 31758.25 0.0000 yes yes 
4 tertiary FDI 62982.45 0.0000 yes yes 
Source: Author’s own calculations  
 
 RE  
Referring back to Table 4.1.1, Similarly to FE, the RE model does not provide a statistically 
significant result for the model (F-stat). While the trade openness variable has now become 
significant, the model as a whole fails the test of whether all the coefficients in the model are 
different from zero. Chi-squared of 0.32 is not less than the 0.05 required. 
 
Table 4.1.4 Total FDI, Hausman Test for choosing FE or RE model (hausman); Total FDI, 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for choosing RE or OLS model (xttest0) 
  Total FDI 
hausman Chi2 2.67 
  prob>chi2 0.7511 
    RE > FE 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test Chibar2 81.98 
  prob>chibar2 0.0000 xttest0   RE > OLS 
variance across panels   26.98% 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
Running the Hausman test on the Total FDI regression, a low Chi-squared value is evident, 
and a Prob>Chi-squared being 0.7511. There is insufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis at all levels of significance. It can thus be concluded that RE is preferred in this 
regression over FE.   
 
The results are also displayed in Table 4.1.4, Chibar-squared equals 81.98, and a probability 
greater than Chibar-squared of 0.00. Therefore the null hypothesis is rejected in the LM test. 
Variance across entities is not zero. Thus, RE is preferred over simple OLS in the total FDI 
regression. 
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It is notable that OLS standard errors tend to be smaller than in the RE or FE cases. OLS 
standard errors underestimate the true standard errors (Refer back to Table 4.1.1 EMC trade 
openness total sector FDI xtgls). OLS coefficient estimates also suffer from the omitted 
variable problem encountered in panel estimation. 
 
 GLS  
Table 4.1.1, column 4, shows the Generalised Least Squares model of Total FDI inflows. The 
use of GLS (4) produces regression results which look reasonable. The model is statistically 
significant at the 95% level with a probability greater than chi-squared of 0.455. With regards 
to the independent variables, only trade openness is significant (and positive). 
 
 
In summary, OLS was ruled out because it does not account for any unobservable country-
specific effects. The Hausman test resulted in RE being preferred over FE. RE allows for time 
invariant varibles (like oil reserves dummy), while FE does not allow for these kinds of time 
invariant variables. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test suggested RE is 
preferable to OLS (since variance across entities is not zero). However, the RE model was 
not statistically significant. Too few observations were available for GMM to be appropriately 
used for the EMC and more specifically APTA samples. Therefore, GLS is deemed the most 
appropriate technique for this sample. The variables look to have the expected signs, and the 
model is significant overall, at the 95% level.  
 
APTA 




For Total FDI using OLS, see table 4.1.5, column 1. A Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroscedasticity was run on the model. The result is displayed in Table 4.1.6. The Chi-
Squared value is 32.15. This high value suggests heteroscedasticity is an issue in the 
aggregate FDI regression.26 
 
                                               
25 To check whether the model looked decent, each of the 12 trade openness variables were regressed 
on the different FDI sectors. In each of the 4 FDI sector regressions, the model was correctly specified, 
with a statistically significant fit. 
26 When running the test on primary, secondary, and tertiary FDI sectors, heteroscedasticity was also 
found present in each OLS regression.  
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Table 4.1.5 APTA Total Sector FDI model selection, Macroeconomic Variables (OLS,FE,RE,GLS), uncorrected. 
Total Sector-wise FDI  1990-2010         1 2 3 4 
Model Selection   OLS FE RE GLS 
Independent Variables       
         
         
openness ln_TradeR4  -0.309 -0.563 0.600* 0.600* 
    (0.379) (0.680) (0.353) (0.339) 
log REER2   -2.578*** 0.367 0.397 0.397 
    (0.827) (0.639) (0.466) (0.447) real GDP growth   -0.0387 0.216*** 0.251*** 0.251*** 
    (0.0744) (0.0554) (0.0415) (0.0398) 
P2   0.00700 0.00531 0.00833 0.00833 
    (0.00640) (0.00809) (0.00791) (0.00758) 
Log GDP per capita  -0.910** -0.104 -0.283 -0.283 
    (0.347) (0.255) (0.220) (0.211) 
         
Constant   20.92*** 1.250 -2.826 -2.826 
    (6.115) (4.824) (2.898) (2.780) 
         
F   9.42 3.16 47.11   
Prob>F   0.0000 0.0131 0.0000   
Wald Chi2       51.20 
Prob > Chi2      0.0000 
R 2   0.4057 0.329 0   
Adj R2   0.3627     
N   75 75 75 75 i          6 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
Besides the evidence of heteroscedasticity, the OLS model looks reasonably specified. It has 
a statistically significant F stat, and an Adjusted R-squared of 36.27%. 
 












reject Heteroscedaticity  





Source: Author’s own calculations 
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 FE 
The model is next estimated by allowing country effects to control for unobservable policy and 
technology effects. Using the FE method (2), we look for any unobserved within country effects 
that need to be accounted for (Refer back to Table 4.1.1, column 2). 
 
It was next necessary to test whether the error variances vary with the effects being modeled. 
This is done by the Modified Wald test for heteroscedasticity (Table 4.1.7). The results are 




Table 4.1.7 Total FDI, Modified Wald test for heteroscedasticity (xttest3) 
xttest3 
modified 




reject Heteroskedaticity  
1 total FDI    5.01E+02 0.0000 yes yes 
Source: Author’s own calculations  
Running xttest2 for cross sectional dependence (Table 4.1.8), the Chi-squared is 34.941 and 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests cross sectional dependence is present in the Total 
FDI regression using FE.28 
Table 4.1.8 Total FDI, test for cross sectional dependence (xttest2) 





1 total FDI 34.941 0.0025 yes yes 
Source: Author’s own calculations  
 RE 
(Refer back to Table 4.1.1, column 3). 
The Hausman test (Table 4.1.9), found a Chi-squared of 11.48, with a probability greater than 
Chi-squared of 0.0426. The null hypothesis is rejected at the 95% level of significance, and 
FE preferred in this regression over RE.29 
                                               
27 As was the case running estat hettest on the OLS models, heteroscedasticity is also present on the 
primary, secondary and tertiary sectors in the FE model.  
28 Issues were encountered with the sector wise FDI. Running xttest2 on primary and secondary FDI 
resulted in errors (too few common observations across panels). Running it on tertiary FDI failed to 
produce a result (correlation matrix of residuals is singular). This could be due to the gaps in our sample 
data for sectoral FDI.  This result was overcome later in the paper by running another test for serial 
correlation (xtserial). 
29 See Appendix Table A4.2.1 for a comparison between APTA (FE) and APTA (GLS) method. 
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Table 4.1.9 Total FDI, Hausman Test for choosing FE or RE model (Hausman) 
    Total FDI 
hausman Chi2 11.48 
  prob>Chi2 0.0426 
    FE>RE 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
multiplier test Chibar2 0.00 
  prob>Chibar2 1.0000 
xttest0   OLS>RE 
variance across panels   0.00% 
Source: Author’s own calculations  
Therefore in the APTA sample, the regressions will be run using a FE model. The results can 





Since the GLS method is chosen as the most appropriate model for the EMC sample subset, 
the GLS method is run on total FDI, and each of the three industry sectors.  The appropriate 
post estimation tests were then run. 
 
FDI = Trade Openness, REER, GDP growth, P2, GDP per capita, E 
 
Fjit = α + β1 + β2ηit + β3Ӽit + eit……………………….(1) 
 
 
Wooldridge (2002) derived a simple test for autocorrelation in panel data models. Drukker 
(2003) provides simulation results showing that the test has decent size and power properties 
in reasonably sized samples. Drukker (2003) wrote a program in Stata called xtserial, to 
perform this test. A significant test statistic indicates the presence of serial correlation. 
 
We test the macroeconomic variable’s models (using GLS) for any heteroscedasticity and/or 
serial correlation.30 The results suggest that while heteroscedasticity is present in all the 
models 1-4, serial correlation is only evident in total FDI and primary FDI (1 & 2).  
                                               
30 See Appendix Table A4.2.2 and A4.2.3 for the post-estimation results  
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Table 4.2.1 shows the results of regressing each of the macroeconomic variables on the 4 
FDI sectors, after accounting/correcting for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, where 
present.  
 
Table 4.2.1: EMC Total, Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Sector FDI. Macroeconomic Variables 
(GLS). Corrected 
Corrected for Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, where present 
GLS EMC  1990-2010 xtgls, after corrections   
Sector-wise FDI and Macroeconomic  variables    
      1 2 3 4 
Dependent Variables     Total FDI Primary FDI Secondary FDI Tertiary FDI 
Independent Variables         
          
          
openness ln_TradeR4   0.843*** 0.0750 0.401*** 0.110 
     (0.252) (0.0682) (0.0691) (0.132) 
log REER2    -0.210 -0.117 -0.776*** 0.876*** 
     (0.455) (0.119) (0.138) (0.260) 
real GDP growth    0.0148 0.00282 0.0231** 0.00227 
     (0.0183) (0.00326) (0.00954) (0.0158) 
P2    0.00103 0.000624 -0.00833*** -0.0159*** 
     (0.00662) (0.00182) (0.00214) (0.00452) 
Log GDP per capita    -0.0612 -0.159*** -0.00639 0.212*** 
     (0.142) (0.0438) (0.0481) (0.0754) 
         
Constant    0.755 1.677*** 2.837*** -4.685*** 
     (2.544) (0.643) (0.823) (1.389) 
          
Wald chi2    13.62 15.04 99.36 37.20 
prob > chi2    0.0180 0.0102 0.0000 0.0000 
rho        
N    314 304 284 296 
i    35 35 35 35 
          
Source: Author’s own calculations.       
*** p <= .01** p<= .05 * p<=.1       
Standard errors are shown below the coefficient in parenthesis     
 
[xtgls, panels(hetero) corr(ar1) force] is used to correct for the heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation present in the total & primary FDI regressions (1 & 2). Since heteroscedasticity, 
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but no serial correlation was present in the remaining regressions (3 & 4), [xtgls, 





The trade openness variable has a positive and significant effect on total FDI inflows (Table 
4.2.1, Column 1). A 10% increase in the trade openness of an EMC (i.e. lower trade barriers), 
results in an 8.43% increase in total FDI, ceteris paribus. Combining all three FDI sectors 
seems to ultimately lead to an increase in total FDI inflows when Those EMC’s open their 
borders to trade. Asiedu (2002) also found a positive effect of trade openness on total FDI. 
When a dummy for African countries was included, this positive effect – while remaining 
positive – diminished in importance. 
 
Other authors who find a similar positive effect include: Kandiero & Chitiga (2003), Edwards 
(1990), Benassy-Quere et al (2001), Jensen (2003), Siem (2009), and Walsh and Yu (2010). 
Although, Walsh & Yu’s positive finding was insignificant. This evidence seems to validate the 
market seeking (export-orientated) and efficiency seeking (vertical) theories of FDI. It also 
suggests that tariff jumping is not the main purpose of FDI into these EMC’s.  
 
Benassy-Quere et al (2001) explain that EMC’s seem to receive a large portion of FDI intended 
for setting up production platforms, with the aim to re-export at least part of this production. 
The regression results for the EMC sample seem to support this a priori theory. The question 




Only GDP per capita has a highly significant and negative coefficient (Table 4.2.1, Column 2). 
EMC’s with higher incomes seems to attract less FDI in the extractive/agricultural sector.  
The remaining macroeconomic variables (Including openness) are not significant when 
regressed on total FDI. This result seems to confirm a view by Walsh & Yu (2010), who 
contend that investments in resource extraction usually have little connection to the broader 
macro economy. Faini (2004) shares this view that trade openness (trade barriers) is unlikely 
to matter much. The main motivation for resource seeking FDI is to produce for exports (often 
back to the home country), rather than for host country consumption.  
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Kandiero & Chitiga’s results however, differ from this paper’s finding regarding the insignificant 
trade openness effect on primary FDI. They found a negative and significant effect of primary 
openness on FDI. Bearing in mind their sample was only for African countries and they 
disaggregated trade openness (one of the independent variables), not FDI (the dependent 
variable). They proposed that efficiency gains and increased investments from increased 
openness in sectors such as services may enable a country to support some of the activities 
in the primary sectors, reducing some of the investments by MNCs. 
 
Lee & van der Mensbrugghe (2001) describe the impact of trade liberalisation on Primary FDI 
as ambiguous. They suggest that the motivation for Primary FDI might include securing energy 
and/or natural resources for the home country. They expect this type of FDI to be less sensitive 
to changes in the trade protectionist regime in the host country. 
 
The constant term of column (2) Indicates that even if the rate of change in all the 
macroeconomic variables were zero, the primary sector FDI/GDP ratio has generally 
increased during the period from 1990 to 2010 by about 1.68 times.  
 
Secondary 
Examining the regression results for the secondary or manufacturing sector (Table 4.2.1, 
column 3), they appear to be quite significant. There is a positive relationship between trade 
openness and secondary FDI. A 10% increase in the trade openness of an EMC member (i.e. 
lower trade barriers), resulted in a 4.01% increase in the secondary sector FDI, ceteris paribus. 
This finding seems to validate the efficiency-seeking (vertical FDI) theory. Vertical FDI firms 
engage in both FDI and exports. It is therefore trade creating. The vertical FDI framework is 
like a developed source country and a developing host country, with the home country usually 
thought of as being much larger market than the host country. For instance, an MNC from the 
U.S., investing in a smaller, lower cost EMC such as Tunisia or Argentina to supply some 
component of the value-chain.   
 
Lee & van der Mensbrugghe (2001) find a similar result in the manufacturing sector. They 
found trade liberalisation lead to an increase in the inward FDI stocks of the manufacturing 
sector in the APEC region. 
Studying manufacturing investment in Central and Eastern Europe, Resmini (2000), found 






A positive but insignificant trade openness effect is found on Tertiary FDI (Table 4.2.1, Column 
4). This finding is supported by Lee & van der Mensbrugghe (2001). In the services sector, 
they suggest a change in the level of trade openness is unlikely to affect the FDI inflows to the 
tertiary sector extensively, because FDI is often the only means to provide foreign services to 
the host country’s consumers.  
 
To summarise the findings thus far, when running the regressions using the EMC sample 
countries, trade openness had a positive and significant effect on total FDI inflows. The effect 
on Primary FDI inflows was slightly positive, but insignificant. Trade openness was positively 
related to FDI into the Secondary sector. Finally, the trade openness variable had a positive 
but insignificant effect on tertiary FDI inflows. 
 
4.3 Control Variables  
 
This section follows on from the previous macroeconomic independent variables, regressed 
on each of the four FDI sector dependant variables, using the GLS method. It now adds each 
of the control variables in turn to the regressions, to see how the model reacts to their 
subsequent inclusion. 
 
When including the control variables: 
FDIjit = β1 + β2ηit + β3Ӽit + zit + eit ……………………….(2)  where, 
zit = each of the control variables in turn (infrastructure matrix; secondary school enrolment; tertiary school enrolment; corruption; natural resources; oil reserves; railway infrastructure) 
 
 
EMC total sector FDI, showing each of the seven control variables - prior to running any of the 
post-regression tests - has been included in the Appendix (Table A4.3.1), to reduce clutter. 
 
To test if heteroscedasticity exists in total sector FDI model, a Modified Wald test was run.31 
All seven of the control variables tested had significant heteroscedasticity present in their 
respective regressions. 
 
                                               
31 See Appendix Table A4.3.2 
50  
Next an xtserial test was performed, with each of the seven institutional variables in the model. 
This is to test for any serial correlation evident in the error structure.32 
The null hypothesis is no serial correlation. In this particular test, the data exhibited does not 
have first-order autocorrelation present in the first four variables, namely infrastructure index, 
secondary education, tertiary education, and corruption. There is serial correlation in the 
regressions that include Natural resources, Oil resources dummy, and telephone subscribers. 
 
Correcting for the presence of Heteroscedasticity in the EMC panel error structure, where no 
serial correlation is evident. We use the panels (hetero) correction after xtgls. 
When the panel exhibits a heteroscedastic and correlated error structure, we use the panels 
(hetero) corr(ar1) force correction after xtgls.  
 
                                               





Table 4.3.1 shows the EMC total sector FDI, after adding the control variables, and correcting 
for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. The results seem to hold up reasonably well. Each 
of the seven regressions still reflect a positive and significant effect of trade openness on total 
FDI. The positive variable of 0.843 is strengthened to 1.208, when the infrastructure index 
variable (Ln_InfralSum2Mis) is included in the regression. However, the positive effect of trade 
openness on FDI is weakened somewhat by the inclusion of the natural resource endowment 
variable (NatResTotExProt).  
 
Besides trade openness, there are very few significant variables.  
 
Table 4.3.1 EMC Total Sector FDI, corrected Control Variables [xtgls panels (hetero)] 
Generalised Least Squares 1990-2010 xtgls, after corrections Corrected for Heteroscedasticity and Serial Correlation, where present 
Sectoral FDI and Institutional Variables  
Dependent Variables  Total FDI as a share of GDP 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Control Variables ln_InfraISum2Mis Educ2nd EducTer  Corrup  NatResTotExProt OilResDum ln_InfraT          
openness (ln_TradeR4) 1.208*** 0.727*** 0.869*** 1.098*** 0.463* 0.865*** 0.765*** 
  (0.183) (0.184) (0.194) (0.325) (0.278) (0.259) (0.273) 
log REER2 -0.488 0.248 -0.227 1.942 -0.299 -0.196 -0.116 
  (0.429) (0.431) (0.373) (1.821) (0.482) (0.458) (0.468) 
real GDP growth 0.00522 0.0193 -0.00855 -0.0782* 0.0170 0.0147 0.0167 
  (0.0302) (0.0182) (0.0156) (0.0412) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0186) 
P2 0.00258 -0.00253 -0.0201** -0.0218 0.00167 0.00109 0.00182 
  (0.00581) (0.00856) (0.00833) (0.0158) (0.00591) (0.00664) (0.00681) 
Log GDP per capita -0.0527 -0.187 0.0376 -0.0475 -0.201 -0.0478 -0.150 
  (0.125) (0.136) (0.125) (0.214) (0.145) (0.149) (0.230) 
         
Qualitative Var. -0.292*** 0.0262*** 0.00118 0.234 -0.623*** 0.0877 0.178 
  (0.0979) (0.00578) (0.00740) (0.171) (0.199) (0.296) (0.241) 
         
Constant 3.336 -1.483 0.408 -10.42 5.194* 0.436 0.0693 
  (2.861) (2.240) (1.881) (8.652) (2.867) (2.742) (2.625) 
         
Wald Chi2 57.95 49.32 37.19 23.35 21.37 13.79 12.12 
prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0016 0.0320 0.0593 
Observations 213 265 233 72 302 314 313 
i 33 35 34 15 34 35 35 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
*** p <= .01** p<= .05 * p<=.1 
Standard errors are shown below the coefficient in parenthesis 
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Turning to primary sector FDI, we jump straight to the post estimation tests, prior to correcting 
for any irregularities in the error structure.33 All seven of the control variables lead to 
Heteroscedasticity in the respective models.   
When testing for serial correlation, evidence is found in all but one regression (EducTer).34 
 
Table 4.3.2 shows the primary sector FDI, using the GLS model, having corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (where present).  
 
Primary sector FDI =  
 
Table 4.3.2: EMC Primary Sector FDI, corrected Control Variables [xtgls panels (hetero)] 
Generalised Least Squares 1990-2010 xtgls, after corrections Corrected for Heteroscedasticity and Serial Correlation, where present 
Sectoral FDI and Institutional Variables  
Dependent Variables Primary FDI as a share of GDP 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Control Variables ln_InfraISum2Mis Educ2nd EducTer  Corrup  NatResTotExProt OilResDum ln_InfraT          
openness (ln_TradeR4) 0.0449 0.0634 0.0436 -0.269 0.0490 0.0922 0.156** 
  (0.0717) (0.0844) (0.0437) (0.291) (0.0826) (0.0623) (0.0612) 
log REER2 -0.210 -0.0632 -0.507*** 1.417 -0.109 -0.0969 -0.209* 
  (0.145) (0.142) (0.113) (0.936) (0.115) (0.102) (0.114) 
real GDP growth 0.00365 -0.000620 0.000249 -0.0471** 0.00306 0.00190 0.00312 
  (0.00420) (0.00406) (0.00548) (0.0225) (0.00301) (0.00256) (0.00299) 
P2 0.00108 0.000744 -0.00615** 0.0193** -0.000282 0.000243 -0.000393 
  (0.00197) (0.00225) (0.00244) (0.00913) (0.00163) (0.00145) (0.00159) 
Log GDP per capita -0.224*** -0.140** -0.363*** -0.682*** -0.156*** -0.111** -0.100* 
  (0.0345) (0.0623) (0.0333) (0.163) (0.0480) (0.0442) (0.0556) 
          
Qualitative Var. -0.223*** -0.00291 0.00346*** 0.157** -0.0625 0.158 -0.136* 
  (0.0419) -0.00333 (0.00134) (0.0614) (0.0604) (0.109) (0.0693) 
          
Constant 4.891*** 1.592** 5.306*** -0.390 1.857** 1.053* 2.337*** 
  (0.892) (0.725) (0.535) (4.301) -0.749 (0.583) (0.624) 
                
Wald Chi2 58.55 15.87 189.06 22.92 12.33 14.22 36.96 
prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0145 0.0000 0.0008 0.0550 0.0273 0.0000 
Observations 205 255 223 66 292 304 303 
i 33 34 34 12 34 35 35 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
*** p <= .01** p<= .05 * p<=.1 
Standard errors are shown below the coefficient in parenthesis 
                                               
33 See Appendix Table A4.3.2 




In the primary FDI regression without the control variables (Table 4.2.1), the trade openness 
variable was 0.0750. i.e. positive but insignificant. When the control variables are added, the 
trade openness variable ranges from -0.269 to +0.156. When including the telecommunication 
Infrastructure variable ln_infraT (column 7), the positive trade openness variable remains 
positive, but now becomes statistically significant (+0.156). 
 
Turning to FDI into the secondary sector, when running the post-estimation tests, as was the 
case in both total and primary sectoral models, heteroscedasticity is again present in all seven 
of the secondary sector regressions.35 
 
Table 4.3.3 EMC Secondary Sector FDI, corrected Control variables, [xtgls panels (hetero)] 
Generalised Least Squares 1990-2010 xtgls, after corrections Corrected for Heteroscedasticity and Serial Correlation, where present 
Sectoral FDI and Institutional Variables  
Dependent Variables  Secondary FDI as a share of GDP 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Control Variables ln_InfraISum2Mis Educ2nd EducTer  Corrup  NatResTotExProt OilResDum ln_InfraT          
openness (ln_TradeR4) 0.442*** 0.441*** 0.480*** 0.649*** 0.446*** 0.429*** 0.324*** 
  (0.128) (0.0724) (0.0787) (0.146) (0.0757) (0.0687) (0.0659) 
log REER2 -1.171*** -0.771*** -0.880*** -1.870*** -0.811*** -0.718*** -0.718*** 
  (0.243) (0.158) (0.171) (0.310) (0.139) (0.139) (0.138) 
real GDP growth 0.0130 0.0266** 0.0179* 0.0225 0.0161 0.0247*** 0.0255*** 
  (0.0122) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0189) (0.0101) (0.00941) (0.00951) 
P2 -0.00590* -0.00631*** -0.00481 -0.0149*** -0.00705*** -0.00798*** -0.00797*** 
  (0.00332) (0.00228) (0.00295) (0.00256) (0.00228) (0.00220) (0.00229) 
Log GDP per capita -0.231*** -0.106* 0.0746 -0.00862 -0.0316 0.0316 -0.159** 
  (0.0726) (0.0623) (0.0689) (0.0979) (0.0495) (0.0470) (0.0783) 
         
Qualitative Var. 0.0908* 0.00868*** -0.00982*** 0.0260 -0.0804* 0.174*** 0.214*** 
  (0.0552) (0.00226) (0.00282) (0.0537) (0.0432) (0.0652) (0.0682) 
         
Constant 5.436*** 2.735*** 2.694*** 7.028*** 3.207*** 2.038** 2.537*** 
  (1.361)   (0.882) (0.966) (1.607) (0.821) (0.839) (0.838) 
         
Wald Chi2 41.71 101.85 79.35 129.05 100.66 101.73 92.64 
prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 194 247 221 69 272 284 283 
I 31 34 33 14 34 35 35 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
*** p <= .01** p<= .05 * p<=.1 
Standard errors are shown below the coefficient in parenthesis 
                                               
35 See Appendix Table A4.3.4 
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Conversely to the primary sector, serial correlation does not appear to be an issue in the 
secondary sector regressions, in all but one instance. Only the infrastructure index variable 
appears to cause serial correlation in this model.36 
 
Having corrected for the problem of heteroscedasticity, the results of the secondary sector FDI 
with the control variables are shown in Table 4.3.3.   
 
Including each of the control variables in turn, seems to increase the magnitude of the trade 
openness variable’s effect on secondary FDI, but only marginally. The sign remains positive 
in each of the seven regressions. The positive coefficient ranges from +0.324 to +0.649.  
 
Table 4.3.4 EMC Tertiary Sector FDI, corrected Control Variables, [xtgls panels (hetero)] 
Generalised Least Squares 1990-2010 xtgls, after corrections Corrected for Heteroscedasticity and Serial Correlation, where present 
Sectoral FDI and Institutional Variables  
Dependent Variables  Tertiary FDI as a share of GDP 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Control Variables ln_InfraISum2Mis Educ2nd EducTer  Corrup  NatResTotExProt OilResDum ln_InfraT          
openness (ln_TradeR4) 0.434*** 0.0551 0.0551 -0.0342 -0.115 0.00306 -0.0567 
  (0.143) (0.126) (0.155) (0.195) (0.145) (0.130) (0.131) 
log REER2 0.407 1.054*** 1.452*** -0.163 0.757*** 0.723*** 1.068*** 
  (0.304) (0.294) (0.339) (0.748) (0.264) (0.251) (0.205) 
real GDP growth -0.0220 0.00313 -0.00295 -0.0365** -0.00146 0.00423 -0.00243 
  (0.0222) (0.0149) (0.0187) (0.0144) (0.0165) (0.0152) (0.0163) 
P2 -0.0105** -0.0133*** -0.0127* -0.0152** -0.0126*** -0.0145*** -0.0161*** 
  (0.00529) (0.00173) (0.00698) (0.00673) (0.00442) (0.00424) (0.00478) 
Log GDP per capita 0.0805 -0.0621 0.154 0.238* 0.193** 0.155** -0.132 
  (0.0897) (0.0848) (0.105) (0.142) (0.0760) (0.0746) (0.104) 
          
Qualitative Var. 0.0252 0.0226*** 0.00685 0.211*** -0.379*** -0.512*** 0.508*** 
  (0.0727) (0.00333) (0.00511) (0.0724) (0.101) (0.162) (0.107) 
         
Constant -2.953 -4.706*** -6.666*** -0.404 -2.203 -2.779* -5.695*** 
  (2.051) (1.546) (1.652) (3.660) (1.484) (1.452) (1.294) 
          
Wald Chi2 25.33 111.72 38.16 18.24 42.20 48.02 57.36 
prob > chi2 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0057 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 201 256 228 72 284 296 295 
i 32 34 33 15 34 35 35 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
*** p <= .01** p<= .05 * p<=.1 
Standard errors are shown below the coefficient in parenthesis 
                                               
36 See Appendix Table A4.3.5 
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Finally, the control variables were introduced to the tertiary sector FDI. Testing for any 
heteroscedasticity in the tertiary FDI model, it was again found to be a factor in each of the 
seven control variables. Running the xtserial test for serial correlation, there is no significant 
evidence of serial correlation present in the error structure.37 
 
Having corrected for the problem of heteroscedasticity, the results of the tertiary sector FDI 
with the control variables are shown in Table 4.3.4.  When we looked at the macroeconomic 
variable models, trade openness – while positive - did not appear to be significant on tertiary 
FDI inflows. Adding the control variables to the tertiary FDI model did not seem to change too 
much regarding significance of the trade openness variable, except for Infrastructure Index 
(1). Adding the Infrastructure Index variable to the model, results in the trade openness 
variable now having a statistically significant positive effect on tertiary FDI. It remained 
insignificant when variables 2-7 are added. 
 
The REER seems to have a positive effect on tertiary FDI. This would suggest tertiary sector 
FDI is attracted to countries with more depreciated real exchange rates.  
With reference to the added control variables, education enrolment ratios (2 & 3), both show 
a positive effect on tertiary FDI, but only secondary education enrolment is significant. This 
suggests that in the service industry of EMC’s, those with more semi-skilled workers (as 
opposed to highly skilled) tend to have a higher share of FDI inflows.  
 
The corruption perception Index has a statistically significant positive effect. It is important to 
reiterate that the corruption variable used in this study is inversely related to the amount of 
corruption experienced in a country. So an improvement in the index by 1 point (a reduction 
in corruption) leads to an increase in the tertiary sector FDI/GDP ratio of 0.211. For countries 
in the sample such as Ecuador, which have a poor corruption perception score of 2.2 out of 
10 and tertiary FDI/GDP of less than 1.0, an increase in the ratio of 0.211 would be a significant 
improvement on FDI Inflows. 
 
Lowering corruption in a country such as Chile, would have less of an impact on its FDI inflows. 
It is already at a high 7.2 on the corruption perception index, so increasing it (reducing 
perceived corruption) may take a significant amount of effort, with relatively little relative gains. 
Even if they do succeed in moving up 1 more level to 8.2 on the index, Chile has a relatively 
                                               
37 See Appendix Tables A4.3.6 and A4.3.7 
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high tertiary FDI/GDP ratio of about 3.261. So that reduction in corruption would only increase 
the ratio by 6.4% (0.211). 
 
Telecommunications is an important industry in the services sector. This is no more evident 
by the positive and statistically significant effect of telephone subscribers on tertiary FDI 
inflows (7). The number of companies outsourcing the call centre function of their business 
has been on the increase. Emerging markets such as India have been reaping the benefits of 




It was determined earlier in the chapter from the tests that the FE method is the most 
appropriate model for the APTA sample subset. The FE method is therefore run on each of 
the four sectors.38  The appropriate post estimation tests were then run. We already know that 
heteroscedasticity is present in each of the four regressions (Table 4.1.6). Next, the test for 
serial correlation was run using xtserial 39. Serial correlation was found in the Total and Tertiary 
regressions (1 & 4).  
 
To account for the within-panel correlation in the regressions (1 & 4), the two regressions were 
adjusted to allow for clustering at the panel level. Since cluster(i) implies robust, this command 
is also robust to heteroscedasticity. For the remaining two regressions, free of serial 
correlation (2 & 3), the robust command was added, to correct for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. The final results of the APTA sectoral FDI regressions using a FE model, 
after corrections, can be seen in Table 4.4.1.  
 
Total 
The trade openness variable has a negative, but insignificant effect on total FDI in the APTA 
sample. The reason for this insignificance could be attributed to the noise of the three FDI 
sectors distorting the aggregate FDI effect. The APTA countries comprise a very diverse set 
of countries in terms of stage-of-development and thus openness. While Loas has a GDP per 
capita in 2013 of US$1,645 and a population size of 6.77 million, South Korea had a GDP per 
capita of US$25,976 and population of over 50 million. Perhaps these vast discrepancies are 
contributing to the poor significance.  
 
                                               
38 These initial results are uncorrected for any irregularities in variance and the error terms, they were 
previously run and can be seen in the Table 4.1.5, column 2. 
39 See Appendix, Table A4.4.1. 
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The Inflation variable is positive and significant. It is the only significant variable in this APTA 
sample using total FDI. A 1% increase in the rate of inflation of an EMC, results in a 0.00531% 
increase in the manufacturing sector FDI, ceteris paribus. This very weak, but positive sign on 
the inflation coefficient may seem counter intuitive, though it can be explained. Since this 
variable is the proxy for monetary policy in the EMC’s, it suggests that the impact of monetary 
policy in these countries on FDI is positive. A similar positive effect of inflation on FDI was 
found in Portugal, in a study by Leitão & Faustino (2010). They suggested that a specific type 
of FDI may be responsible for this positive sign on higher inflation rates.  
 
 
Table 4.4.1 APTA Total, Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Sector FDI. Macroeconomic 
Variables (FE). Corrected 
  corrected for heteroscedasticity and/or serial correlation (within) 
FE  APTA 1990-2010 xtreg, fe   
Sectoral FDI and Macroeconomic Variables       
    1 2 3 4 
Dependent Variables   Total FDI Primary FDI Secondary FDI Tertiary FDI 
Independent Variables         
            
            
openness ln_TradeR4 -0.563 -0.0306 -1.080** -0.207 
    (1.096) (0.101) (0.251) (0.284) 
log REER2   0.367 -0.0420 0.0436 0.560 
    (0.294) (0.187) (0.934) (0.435) 
real GDP growth  0.216 -0.00591 -0.00592 0.0129 
    (0.146) (0.0101) (0.0391) (0.0176) 
P2   0.00531** 0.00663*** 0.00357*** 0.0104*** 
    (0.00159) (9.17e-05) (0.000309) (0.000281) 
Log GDP per capita  -0.104 -0.0249 -0.111 0.119 
    (0.101) (0.0683) (0.392) (0.123) 
            
Constant   1.250 0.558 5.535 -2.108 
    (5.632) (1.070) (7.599) (2.805) 
              
F   880.15       
Prob>F   0.0000       
rho   0.3295 0.7213 0.8893 0.5078 
N   75 46 46 52 
i     6 5 5 5 
Source: Author’s own calculations.      
*** p <= .01** p<= .05 * p<=.1      




In the primary sector regression, a negative but insignificant effect of trade openness on 
primary FDI was found on the APTA sample. While Kandiero & Chitiga’s (2003) also find a 
negative effect, their result was statistically significant. The insignificant effect found follows 




The trade openness variable is negative and significant at the 95% level.  A 10% decrease in 
the trade openness of an EMC (i.e. higher trade barriers), results in a 10.8% increase in the 
manufacturing sector FDI, ceteris paribus. This somewhat surprising finding seems to validate 
the tariff jumping FDI theories, and the non-export orientated horizontal FDI as suggested by 
Siem (2009). He finds a similar negative relationship between openness and FDI in his sample 
of Transition countries40. This is also in line with the findings of research by Jordaan (2004). 
He suggests MNC’s seeking to supply the local host country market, might decide to set up 
subsidiaries in the host country if it is prohibitive to export their product from the home country.  
 
Tertiary 
In the tertiary sector regression, a negative but insignificant effect of trade openness on 
tertiary FDI was found on the APTA sample. 
 
4.5 EMC vs APTA (PTA) 
Does being in a PTA exhibit different effects from trade openness on FDI inflows? 
Table 4.5.1 combines the regression results of both the EMC macroeconomic variables, and 
those of the APTA sample. The comparison here is between EMC and APTA for each of the 
four FDI sectors. In evaluating the table, we will focus purely on the trade openness variable’s 
effect on FDI.  
 
Total 
Trade openness variable for EMC (column 1) is positive and significant at the 99% confidence 
level, while APTA (2) is negative and insignificant.  
 
Primary 
The effect of trade openness on primary FDI for EMC (3) is positive but insignificant. For APTA 
(4), the effect is negative but still insignificant. 
                                               





Table 4.5.1 EMC vs APTA Total, Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Sector FDI. Macroeconomic 
Variables (FE)   
  
corrected for heteroscedasticity and/or serial correlation (within)      
GLS/FE     1990-2010   gls/xtreg, fe        
Sectoral FDI and Macroeconomic Variables               
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent Variables EMC - Total FDI APTA - Total FDI 
EMC - Primary FDI APTA - Primary FDI 
EMC - Secondary FDI 
APTA - Secondary FDI 
EMC - Tertiary FDI 
APTA - Tertiary FDI 
Independent Variables                 
                  
openness 0.843*** -0.563 0.0750 -0.0306 0.401*** -1.080** 0.110 -0.207 
(ln_TradeR4) (0.252) (1.096) (0.0682) (0.101) (0.0691) (0.251) (0.132) (0.284) 
log REER2 -0.210 0.367 -0.117 -0.0420 -0.776*** 0.0436 0.876*** 0.560 
  (0.455) (0.294) (0.119) (0.187) (0.138) (0.934) (0.260) (0.435) 
real GDP growth 0.0148 0.216 0.00282 -0.00591 0.0231** -0.00592 0.00227 0.0129 
  (0.0183) (0.146) (0.00326) (0.0101) (0.00954) (0.0391) (0.0158) (0.0176) 
P2 0.00103 0.00531** 0.000624 0.00663*** -0.00833*** 0.00357*** -0.0159*** 0.0104*** 
  (0.00662) (0.00159) (0.00182) (9.17e-05) (0.00214) (0.000309) (0.00452) (0.000281) 
Log GDP per capita -0.0612 -0.104 -0.159*** -0.0249 -0.00639 -0.111 0.212*** 0.119 
  (0.142) (0.101) (0.0438) (0.0683) (0.0481) (0.392) (0.0754) (0.123) 
                  
Constant 0.755 1.250 1.677*** 0.558 2.837*** 5.535 -4.685*** -2.108 
  (2.544) (5.632) (0.643) (1.070) (0.823) (7.599) (1.389) (2.805) 
                  
F 13.62 880.15 15.04   99.36   37.20   
Prob>F 0.0180 0.0000 0.0102   0.0000   0.0000   
rho   0.3295   0.7213   0.8893   0.5078 
N 314 75 304 46 284 46 296 52 
i 35 6 35 5 35 5 35 5 
Source: Author’s own calculations.         
*** p <= .01** p<= .05 * p<=.1         




The Trade Openness variable for EMC secondary FDI (5) and APTA secondary FDI (6) are 
both significant. Where they differ is in the direction of their signs. EMC trade openness has a 
positive effect, while APTA trade openness has a strong negative effect on secondary FDI 
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inflows. It appears that in the EMC’s, manufacturing FDI inflows are efficiency seeking or 
vertical in nature. While APTA country’s manufacturing FDI is perhaps of the non-export 
horizontal type. Horizontal FDI substitutes for trade and is generally fostered by high trade 
barriers in host countries. (Faini, 2004) 
 
Tertiary 
In the services industry, it appears that trade for EMC (7) could be complementary with tertiary 
FDI inflows. This result must be taken with care, since the variable is insignificant at the normal 
levels. APTA’s (8) trade openness appears to have a negative effect on tertiary FDI inflows 
(Though this coefficient is also insignificant). Walsh and Yu (2010) believed that most services 
FDI is likely to be of a horizontal nature, aimed at the host country market in which the 
investment is made, rather than vertical, intended for export. As a result, they expected 
regression results on tertiary FDI that have little to do with trade flows per se. In their paper, 
they were surprised to find a strong positive coefficient of trade openness on tertiary FDI. In 
this present paper, the ambiguous direction and insignificance of both the EMC and APTA 
results for tertiary FDI, seems to exhibit the a priori theory. 
 
Implications of the research for EMCs 
(i) It is hoped that governments will ensure that their companies, and the companies investing 
within its borders be held more accountable for their transactions. In addition, MNC’s dealings 
with the host country are completed in a more transparent manner. 
(ii) To enhance FDI flows in an effort to catch up those of the developed world, EMCs can 
liberalise their trade regimes. 
(iii) Improving the corruption perception index score in the EMCs would have a positive effect 
on primary FDI inflows. Governments in these countries need to ensure stability of their 
institutions, reliable and credible policy with long term goals of reducing corruption.  
 
Implications of the research for MNCs 
(i) The type of trade agreement – that the particular host country is a member of – is important.  
(ii) The MNC looking to accrue improved production efficiencies (through vertical FDI), should 
seek investment opportunities in the EMC countries, if they expect trade policy in those 
countries to be liberalised (Particularly if the MNC’s line of business is involved with 
manufacturing). If the MNC is concerned with expanding its market by investing in an export 
platform in a host country, it could exert pressure on its home country Government and lobby 
for more trade openness in the host countries it intends investing in.  
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These findings are evidence that making inferences simply on empirical results at an 
economy-wide level could miss-interpret or incorrectly predict the sign (direction) of the 
change in FDI, following an increase in a nation’s economic trade openness.  
 
Having examined the regression results and attempted to answer the paper’s objectives, we 
next move to the concluding chapter, where the findings are summarised. 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Way Forward 
 
The purpose of this study was to address a central research question that will enable us to 
understand the impact trade openness has on FDI.  Do efforts by governments to liberalise 
trade barriers (thereby increasing trade openness), lead to an increase of FDI into the host 
country? The empirical evidence would suggest there is certainly a link, but whether this is a 
positive link, depends on the sample of countries examined, and the sector into which the FDI 
is flowing.   
 
Previous research has focused on the effect trade openness has on total FDI to GDP, at the 
aggregate level.41 Only a handful of research has been done at a disaggregated level.42  
 
Regarding which of the numerous trade openness variables postulated should be used, it was 
established that the simple trade intensity ratio was the most appropriate for examining the 
link between trade openness and FDI. It is the one of the most common measures of the trade 
openness variable. It allowed for the largest sample size to be included compared to the other 
possible proxies, and seemed to provide robust regression results in this study. 
 
5.1 EMC 
Using a comprehensive sample of emerging market countries, together with panel data 
techniques, the paper disaggregated total FDI inflows to empirically investigate - at sectoral 
level - the effect trade openness has on primary, secondary and tertiary FDI inflows. From the 
regression tests, it was determined that GLS was the most appropriate regression method in 
this sample of countries. EMC regression results seem to follow the findings of Gastanaga et 
                                               
41 Gastanaga, Nugent, & Pashamova (1998), Asiedu (2002), Addison & Heshmati (2003), Nonnemberg 
& Cardoso de Mendonça (2004), and Faini (2004) 
42 Lee & van der Mensbrugghe (2001), Walsh & Yu (2010) 
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al (1998), and Faini (2004). The trade openness variable has a positive and significant effect 
on total FDI, and secondary FDI inflows. A 10% increase in the trade openness of an EMC 
member (i.e. lower trade barriers), resulted in an 8.43% increase in the total sector FDI, and 
a 4.01% increase in the secondary sector FDI, ceteris paribus. Trade liberalisation is therefore 
an important motive for FDI in the manufacturing sector of EMCs. These findings validate both 
the efficiency seeking (vertical FDI) and market seeking (horizontal FDI) theories. As the 
EMC’s liberalise their trade policies, MNC’s looking to improve production efficiencies in their 
organisation, seem to turn to EMCs for either their upstream or downstream value-chain 
expansions. Regarding the market seeking theory, the results seemed to be consistent with 
previous empirical research such as Benassy-Quere et al (2001), among others. MNC’s 
seeking a market to set up an export platform, will tend to increase their FDI into the host 
country the more open that particular country is to trade.  
When run on the primary and tertiary sectors, the results of the trade openness variable – 
while positive - were not statistically significant enough to draw any conclusions.  
 
EMCs with less perceived corruption have a higher flow of FDI into the manufacturing sector, 
when they liberalise their trade regime.  
When an EMC’s infrastructural facilities are accounted for, the more liberal the trade regime, 
the more inflows of FDI into the services sector occurs, ceteris paribus.  
 
An important point is that determinants of FDI flows differ significantly across countries. 
Focusing only on total FDI inflows, one could miss the changes specific to each of the three 
Industry Sectors. Each of these sectors appears to have their own set of determinants. 
Aggregating them could lead to significant noise, which may make any interpretation 
meaningless. Very little research has previously attempted to undertake this level of 
disaggregation of FDI at the sector level. This paper’s contribution to the literature is to stress 
the need for FDI flows to be examined as FDI into primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors. 
With these findings in mind, the policy makers of EMCs seeking increased FDI from home 
countries should continue a number of policy changes to further liberalise their economies to 
trade: 
They should aim to reduce bureaucratic red-tape hampering free trade e.g. import licences. It 
is important that governments implement trade policies in a transparent way. There should be 
clear and open dialogue between key stakeholders. They should reduce trade restrictive 
effects that exceed what is deemed necessary to reach a required regulatory objective. They 
should endeavour to remove all tariff and non-tariff barriers between themselves and their 
trade partners. This would include the removal of import bans, export prohibitions, import 
levies, export taxes and subsidies. 
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At the very least, These EMCs should be obeying externally set tariff rate guidelines, as set 
by the WTO.   
 
5.2 APTA 
Fixed Effects was the most appropriate method in this sample of countries.  
In contrast to the EMC sample, the APTA trade openness variable has a negative and 
significant effect on manufacturing sector FDI inflows. A 10% decrease in the trade openness 
of an APTA member (i.e. higher trade barriers), results in a 10.8% increase in the 
manufacturing sector FDI, ceteris paribus. This somewhat surprising finding is in line with the 
- once popular - tariff jumping theories of FDI. This follows the findings of Siem (2009), 
although his sample covered transitional countries. FDI flowing into the countries in the APTA 
region appears to be an attempt to circumvent tariff restrictions.  
 
5.3 Future research 
More effort needs to be spent on improving the data collection of FDI at the sectoral level. 
Different countries use different methods and standards to account for the FDI. UNCTAD’s 
country profiles are probably the most comprehensive and standardised of all the data 
available, but even this data is not widespread enough nor does it cover sufficient countries. 
As the quality of the data improves and the period of observation increases, this will only help 
to strengthen the empirical analysis’ validity. 
 
Future research could be undertaken on (i) Sectoral FDI data, disaggregated at an even 
further level. Ideally, using investment-level data, classified by industry, and available across 
a wide variety of countries. At this time, such a dataset is not readily available. 
(ii) Extending the work done by this paper (regressing the variables on sectoral FDI), and 
supplementing it with the approach used by Kandiero & Chitiga (2003) (sectoral trade 
openness variables). This future research could prove useful to the Governments of these 
countries seeking to target certain industries/sectors for growth. If Governments want to 
increase FDI into a particular sector, this research could possibly tell them on which trade and 
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1. Export/GDP ratio.  
The export ratio is the percentage of domestic output that is exported. 
Source: Authors own classification  
2. Import/GDP ratio. 
The import penetration rate is the percentage of domestic demand fulfilled by imports (OECD, 
2003). 
 
3a. Tariff Simple Mean  
Taken from The World Bank’s definition:  
“Simple mean applied tariff is the unweighted average of effectively applied rates for all 
products subject to tariffs calculated for all traded goods. Data are classified using the 
Table A2.1 Trade openness measures 
Measure Variable Author 
1.  Exports/GDP  
2.  Imports/GDP  
3a. Tariff Simple Mean   
3b. Tariff Weighted Mean   
4. Simple Trade Share (Exports+Imports)/nGDP Dollar & Kraay (2001) 
5.  (Exports+Imports)/GNP Kumar Kar (1983) 
6.  (Exports+Imports)/PPP(GDP) Brahmbhatt (1998)  
7. size of immigrant population   Brahmbhatt (1998) 
8. Restrictions on export proceeds   Asiedu & Lien, Capital Controls and Foreign 
Direct Investment (2004) 
9 Composite Dummy Var  Sachs and Warner (1995) 
10 Corrected for size of country Exports/GDPPerCapita Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1999), Jaumotte (2004) 
11  (Exports+Imports)/GDPPerCapita  
12 Trade Openness Index (TOI)   Skipton (2003) 
13 Composite trade intensity (TI + RWTI) Squalli & Wilson (2006)  
14 Adjusted trade intensity  (X +M)i/2(GDP +M)I Anderson (2004) 
15 Adj trade intensity  1 − [(X +M)i/2GDPi] × 100 Frankel (2000) 
16  (X +M)/rGDPi Alcala and Ciccone 
(2004) 
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Harmonized System of trade at the six- or eight-digit level. Tariff line data were matched to 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) revision 3 codes to define commodity 
groups. Effectively applied tariff rates at the six- and eight-digit product level are averaged 
for products in each commodity group. When the effectively applied rate is unavailable, the 
most favored nation rate is used instead.” (The World Bank, 2013) 
Dollar and Kraay (2001) find contention with this method. They argue that available data on 
tariffs are an imperfect measure of trade policy. They tend to be biased upwards, giving 
disproportionate weighting to tariffs on products that represent a small proportion of imports. 
3b. Tariff Weighted Mean  
Taken from The World Bank’s definition:  
“Weighted mean applied tariff is the average of effectively applied rates weighted by the 
product import shares corresponding to each partner country. Data are classified using the 
Harmonized System of trade at the six- or eight-digit level. Tariff line data were matched to 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) revision 3 codes to define commodity 
groups and import weights. To the extent possible, specific rates have been converted to 
their ad valorem equivalent rates and have been included in the calculation of weighted 
mean tariffs. Import weights were calculated using the United Nations Statistics Division's 
Commodity Trade (Comtrade) database. Effectively applied tariff rates at the six- and eight-
digit product level are averaged for products in each commodity group. When the effectively 
applied rate is unavailable, the most favored nation rate is used instead.” (The World Bank, 
2013) 
In a global market place where trade policy distortions are increasingly obscure, calculating a 
country’s total barriers to trade is prohibitively complex:  
“Simply using tariff data, clearly fails to deal with non-tariff barriers to trade. These non-
tariff barriers ranging from explicit quotas & licensing schemes to local content 
requirements and health & safety standards can often constitute significant obstacles to 
trade and should be accounted for. Trade-weighted tariffs also give no weight to tariffs on 
goods that are so high that imports are choked off entirely.” (Hiscox & Kastner, 2004). 
4. The Simple Trade Share, as proposed by Dollar and Kraay (2001). This comprises 
(Exports+Imports)/nGDP and measures the proportional changes in trade volumes relative to 
GDP. Also known as the Simple Trade Intensity (Squalli & Wilson, 2006), it is one of the most 
commonly used ratios in the literature as a proxy for measuring trade openness. The 
advantage of a trade volumes measure is that they in part account for non-tariff trade barriers 
(Dollar & Kraay, 2001). Trade to GDP ratios are not without their critics:  
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“They tend to bias against countries with large internal markets and countries that are 
relatively isolated from other countries (and hence would be expected to trade less for any 
given level of policy openness).” (Hiscox & Kastner, 2004). 
7. Brahmbhatt (1998) suggested an alternative approach to measuring openness. He 
suggested the size of immigrant population be used as a proxy. A country with a larger 
immigrant population, would be seen to be more open. 
10. Exports/GDP (corrected for size of country). see Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1999). This 
variable is also used in Jaumotte (2004). 
11. (Exports+Imports)/GDPPerCapita. An extension of Barro & Sala-i-Martin’s Openness variable, 
including Imports into the equation. 
12. Trade Openness Index (TOI). see Skipton (2003) 
13. The Composite Trade Intensity ratio proposed by Squalli & Wilson (2006) extends on the 
popular Simple Trade Share. It comprises two dimensions: Trade Intensity and Relative World 
Trade Intensity (TI + RWTI). The first dimension (TI) comprises the proportion of a given 
country’s total income accrued via international trade. It is essentially 
(Exports+Imports)/nGDP).  
The second dimension added by Squalli & Wilson (RWTI) attempts to account for the share 
of trade that a country generates relative to total global trade. They suggest that using just the 
Trade Intensity dimension on its own is a prohibitive method of accounting for Trade 
Openness. It only looks at the relative position of a country’s trade performance compared to 
its own domestic economy.  
14. Adjusted trade intensity  (X +M)i/2(GDP +M)I. GDP and Imports are added together and 
multiplied by two in the denominator.  See Anderson (2004) for further clarification. 
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Table A3.1: Sources of EMCs in sample 
  EMI The Economist IMF EMGP 
Argentina *   * * 
Bolivia     *   
Brazil * * * * 
Bulgaria *   *   
Chile * * * * 
China * * * * 
Colombia * * *   
Costa Rica     *   
Croatia     *   
Czech Republic   * *   
Dominican Republic *   *   
Ecuador *   *   
Egypt * * *   
El Salvador     *   
Hungary * * * * 
India * * * * 
Indonesia * * *   
Israel       * 
Jordan     *   
Kenya *       
Lebanon *       
Malaysia * * *   
Mexico * * * * 
Morocco * * *   
Pakistan *   *   
Panama     *   
Paraguay     *   
Peru * * *   
Philippines   * *   
Poland * * * * 
Romania *   *   
Russia * * * * 
Senegal *       
Slovak Rep.     *   
Slovenia       * 
South Africa * * * * 
South Korea   *   * 
Taiwan   *   * 
Thailand * * * * 
Tunisia *   *   
Turkey * * * * 
Ukraine *   *   
Uruguay *   *   
Venezuela *   *   




Table A3.2: EMCs in sample  
Synthesized Country List  
Arranged according to Continental origin (Excluded countries in parentheses) 
North America South America Europe Asia Africa 
Costa Rica  Argentina  Bulgaria  China Egypt 
Dominican Republic  Bolivia  Croatia  India Morocco  
El Salvador  Brazil  Czech Republic  Indonesia Nigeria 
Mexico Chile  Hungary  Malaysia  South Africa 
 Columbia  Poland  Pakistan  Tunisia  
 Ecuador  Romania  Thailand    
 Paraguay  Russian Federation  Vietnam    
  Peru  Slovak Republic     
   Turkey  
(Froot & 
Stein, 1991) 
(Froot & Stein, 
1991)   
  Ukraine   
(Jamaica)  (Uruguay)  (Jordan)  (Israel) 
(Panama)   (Philippines)  
(Trinidad and Tobago)   (South Korea)  
  
Table A3.3 shows Total FDI as the dependent variable. Using the Simple Mean Tariff 
(Trade3a) and Simple Weighted Mean Tariff as the openness variable (Trade3b) on Total 
Sector-Wise FDI did not produce significant statistics. Neither of their Wald Chi-squared 
values (5.00 and 4.68 respectively), are significant at the normal levels. This suggests using 
the actual tariff values are poor measures for openness on Total FDI inflows. 
The Simple trade intensity variable (ln_TradeR4) for total FDI is positive and significant. The 
Wald Chi-squared test statistic shows the model using this variable is significant at the 95% 
level.  
 
The Composite Trade Intensity variable (ln_TradeR13) has a negative and strongly significant 










Table A3.4 shows the various trade openness variables, regressed on Primary FDI inflows. 
The Simple Mean Tariff (Trade3a) and Simple Weighted Mean Tariff (Trade3b) variables on 
Primary FDI did not produce significant statistics. However, when using each of these tariff 
variables in turn, the model is reasonably specified, significant at the 99% confidence level.  
 
 
Table A3.3 EMC Trade Openness: Total Sector FDI, xtgls 
Dependent 
Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Independent 
Variables 
             
TradeR1 0.0114             
  (0.00753)             
TradeR2  0.0258***            
   (0.00799)            
Trade3a   -0.0143           
    (0.0246)           
Trade3b    0.00334          
     (0.0254)          
TradeR4     0.00944**         
      (0.00396)         
ln_TradeR4      0.853***        
       (0.323)        
Trade7 
      
-2.65e-
07       
        (2.14e-07)       
ln_TradeR10        -0.581***      
         (0.117)      
ln_TradeR11         -0.602***     
          (0.123)     
ln_TradeR13          -0.519***    
           (0.126)    
ln_TradeR14           -0.317***   
            (0.0606)   
ln_TradeR15            -0.319*** 
             (0.0597) 
 
log REER2 0.916 0.336 1.031 1.089 0.629 0.485 1.189 1.354** 1.415** 1.845*** 1.201** 1.118* 
  (0.651) (0.663) (0.699) (0.694) (0.660) (0.671) (1.169) (0.580) (0.581) (0.602) (0.578) (0.578) 
real GDP growth 0.0106 0.00896 0.0316 0.0322 0.00839 0.00793 -0.00378 0.0622 0.0616 0.0590 0.0607 0.0602 




0.000308 -0.0185 -0.0227 -0.00366 -0.00377 -0.00174 -0.0126 -0.0143 -0.0116 -0.0139 -0.0133 
  (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0197) (0.0203) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0176) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
Log GDP per capita -0.0182 -0.109 0.0535 0.130 -0.0665 -0.0477 0.239 -0.212 -0.227 0.352* 0.365** 0.354** 
  (0.185) (0.183) (0.244) (0.240) (0.184) (0.181) (0.305) (0.180) (0.181) (0.187) (0.180) (0.179) 
  
  
Constant -1.117 1.610 -1.399 -2.414 0.258 -2.069 -3.826 2.747 3.181 -3.596 1.829 3.706 
  (3.679) (3.699) (4.298) (4.171) (3.701) (3.445) (6.660) (3.530) (3.570) (3.376) (3.449) (3.546) 
  
  
Wald chi2 8.30 16.61 5.00 4.68 11.76 13.11 3.91 31.30 30.53 23.25 33.93 35.20 
prob > chi2 0.1403 0.0053 0.5611 0.4568 0.0382 0.0224 0.5619 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 
rho              
N 314 314 233 233 314 314 67 314 314 314 314 314 
i 35 35 35 35 35 35 33 35 35 35 35 35 
Source: Author’s 
calculations. *** p <= .001 ** p<= .01 * p<=.05 Standard errors are shown below the coefficient in parenthesis 
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When regressing on Primary FDI inflows, the log of Simple Trade Intensity (ln_TradeR4) is 
now a negative relationship, but no longer significant. The actual model itself is significant at 
the 99% level. 
 
Table A3.4 EMC Trade Openness: Primary Sector FDI, xtgls 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Independent 
Variables 
             
TradeR1 -0.00472             
  (0.00368)             
TradeR2  -0.00515            
   -0.00396            
Trade3a   0.00585           
    (0.0121)           
Trade3b    0.00549          
     (0.0124)          
TradeR4     -0.00257         
      (0.00195)         
ln_TradeR4      -0.113        
       (0.162)        
Trade7 
      
-1.49e-
07       
  
      
(1.35e-
07)       
ln_TradeR10        -0.208***      
         (0.0591)      
ln_TradeR11         -0.225***     
          (0.0620)     
ln_TradeR13          -0.265***    
           (0.0616)    
ln_TradeR14           -0.110***   
            (0.0310)   
ln_TradeR15            -0.105*** 
             (0.0307) 
 
log REER2 0.364 0.398 0.138 0.123 0.388 0.314 -0.352 0.246 0.271 0.503* 0.194 0.168 
  (0.317) (0.327) (0.339) (0.336) (0.323) (0.329) (0.562) (0.287) (0.287) (0.293) (0.287) (0.288) 
real GDP growth -0.0142 -0.0157 -0.0247 -0.0248 -0.0148 -0.0162 0.0219 -0.00197 -0.00143 0.00303 -0.00296 -0.00386 
  (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0452) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0190) 
P2 0.0134** 0.0126** 0.0117 0.0114 0.0129** 0.0135** 0.0179** 0.0125** 0.0118** 0.0122** 0.0122** 0.0125** 
  (0.00540) (0.00550) (0.00963) (0.00990) (0.00544) (0.00544) (0.00849) (0.00529) (0.00530) (0.00524) (0.00530) (0.00530) 
Log GDP per capita -0.404*** -0.404*** -0.442*** -0.446*** -0.403*** -0.422*** -0.344** -0.515*** -0.524*** -0.273*** -0.309*** -0.318*** 
  (0.0918) (0.0919) (0.119) (0.117) (0.0920) (0.0905) (0.149) (0.0905) (0.0909) (0.0943) (0.0943) (0.0938) 
    
Constant 2.336 2.215 3.532* 3.652* 2.242 3.009* 4.834 4.958*** 5.207*** 2.661 4.542*** 5.080*** 
  (1.803) (1.833) (2.090) (2.031) (1.821) (1.709) (3.218) (1.753) (1.767) (1.659) (1.720) (1.770) 
    
Wald chi2 42.42 42.47 27.13 27.09 42.53 41.11 13.21 54.55 55.49 61.60 54.76 53.87 
prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0215 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
rho              
N 304 304 228 228 304 304 65 304 304 304 304 304 
i 35 35 35 35 35 35 33 35 35 35 35 35 
Source: Author’s 
calculations. *** p <= .001 ** p<= .01 * p<=.05 Standard errors are shown below the coefficient in parenthesis 
 
Another variable with a good model fit is the Composite Trade Intensity variable 
(ln_TradeR13). Its Wald Chi-squared value of 61.60 is the highest of all the openness 
variables and significant at the 99% level. Using ln_TradeR4 in this model has a reasonable 
Wald Chi-squared statistic of 41.11, but still highly significant at even the 99% level. The 
coefficient ln_TradeR13 has a statistically significant and negative effect on Primary FDI 
inflows.  
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Table A3.5 EMC Trade Openness: Secondary Sector FDI, xtgls 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Independent Variables              
TradeR1 0.00959***             
  (0.00276)             
TradeR2  0.0136***            
   (0.00297)            
Trade3a   -0.0104           
    (0.0114)           
Trade3b    -0.00962          
     (0.0135)          
TradeR4     0.00593***         
      (0.00146)         
ln_TradeR4      0.487***        
       (0.121)        
Trade7       -1.02e-07       
        (1.16e-07)       
ln_TradeR10        -0.0603      
         (0.0455)      
ln_TradeR11         -0.0631     
          (0.0478)     
ln_TradeR13          0.0147    
           (0.0489)    
ln_TradeR14           -0.0438*   
            (0.0237)   
ln_TradeR15            -0.0479** 
             (0.0233) 
 
log REER2 -0.515** -0.732*** -0.226 -0.190 -0.630** -0.673** -0.715 -0.149 -0.141 -0.174 -0.169 -0.184 
  (0.258) (0.265) (0.269) (0.261) (0.262) (0.267) (0.531) (0.241) (0.241) (0.248) (0.240) (0.240) 
real GDP growth 0.0485*** 0.0500*** 0.0563*** 0.0566*** 0.0487*** 0.0492*** 0.0174 0.0626*** 0.0626*** 0.0556*** 0.0642*** 0.0647*** 
  (0.0161) (0.0157) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0404) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0169) (0.0166) (0.0165) 
P2 -0.00696 -0.00450 -0.0103 -0.0101 -0.00574 -0.00582 -0.00877 -0.0105** -0.0106** -0.00943* -0.0108** -0.0108** 
  (0.00481) (0.00482) (0.00819) (0.00820) (0.00481) (0.00481) (0.00886) (0.00488) (0.00489) (0.00490) (0.00486) (0.00485) 
Log GDP per capita -0.0385 -0.0536 0.0250 0.0293 -0.0490 -0.0277 0.00840 0.0146 0.0125 0.0215 0.0888 0.0923 
  (0.0750) (0.0736) (0.0887) (0.0905) (0.0744) (0.0732) (0.142) (0.0747) (0.0750) (0.0818) (0.0794) (0.0788) 
    
Constant 3.145** 4.050*** 1.789 1.557 3.644** 2.089 4.256 1.815 1.862 1.354 1.857 2.193 
  (1.438) (1.448) (1.665) (1.620) (1.446) (1.342) (2.935) (1.414) (1.425) (1.374) (1.390) (1.422) 
  
  
Wald chi2 32.63 42.01 15.83 15.49 37.44 37.14 3.58 21.53 21.56 19.80 23.34 24.21 
prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0073 0.0084 0.0000 0.0000 0.6107 0.0006 0.0006 0.0014 0.0003 0.0002 
rho              
N 284 284 214 214 284 284 59 284 284 284 284 284 
i 35 35 35 35 35 35 32 35 35 35 35 35 
Source: Author’s calculations. *** p <= .001 ** p<= .01 * p<=.05 Standard errors are shown below the coefficient in parenthesis 
 
Using the log of Simple Trade Intensity variable (ln_TradeR4) seems to have one of the better 
model fits when regressing on Secondary FDI data. As exhibited in Table A3.5.  It has a Wald 
Chi-squared value of 37.14, easily significant at the 99% level.  
 
Both of the tariff variables (Trade3a and Trade3b) are negative but insignificant. Ln_TradeR4 
and ln_TradeR13 have positive coefficients, but only ln_TradeR4 has a statistically significant 
effect on Secondary FDI. No serial correlation is present when each of these variables 




Table A3.6 EMC Trade Openness: Tertiary Sector FDI, xtgls 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Independent Variables              
TradeR1 0.00250             
  (0.00498)             
TradeR2  0.0129**            
   (0.00531)            
Trade3a   -0.0390*           
    (0.0215)           
Trade3b    -0.0313          
     (0.0254)          
TradeR4     0.00381         
      (0.00263)         
ln_TradeR4      0.273        
       (0.214)        
Trade7       3.29e-08       
        (1.56e-07)       
ln_TradeR10        -0.335***      
         (0.0758)      
ln_TradeR11         -0.342***     
          (0.0797)     
ln_TradeR13          -0.351***    
           (0.0826)    
ln_TradeR14           -0.172***   
            (0.0394)   
ln_TradeR15            -0.172*** 
             (0.0388) 
 
log REER2 1.352*** 0.897* 1.023** 1.186** 1.142** 1.154** 1.905** 1.440*** 1.484*** 1.826*** 1.353*** 1.302*** 
  (0.459) (0.474) (0.521) (0.509) (0.468) (0.477) (0.930) (0.408) (0.408) (0.418) (0.408) (0.409) 
real GDP growth 0.00114 -0.00377 0.00244 0.00366 -0.00202 -0.00103 -0.0497 0.0327 0.0325 0.0367 0.0306 0.0299 
  (0.0278) (0.0274) (0.0335) (0.0337) (0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0694) (0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0278) (0.0274) (0.0273) 
P2 -0.0239*** -0.0202** -0.0438*** -0.0424*** -0.0224*** -0.0228*** -0.0148 -0.0286*** -0.0295*** -0.0287*** -0.0289*** -0.0285*** 
  (0.00779) (0.00784) (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.00782) (0.00781) (0.0155) (0.00755) (0.00759) (0.00757) (0.00756) (0.00754) 
Log GDP per capita 0.261** 0.191 0.185 0.222 0.224* 0.239* 0.452* 0.152 0.143 0.515*** 0.467*** 0.459*** 
  (0.130) (0.128) (0.169) (0.172) (0.129) (0.127) (0.243) (0.123) (0.124) (0.132) (0.127) (0.126) 
    
Constant -6.464** -4.265* -3.557 -4.763 -5.415** -6.439*** -10.37** -3.679 -3.501 -7.682*** -4.305* -3.282 
  (2.547) (2.583) (3.230) (3.146) (2.576) (2.384) (5.107) (2.400) (2.425) (2.295) (2.364) (2.429) 
  
  
Wald chi2 30.74 36.95 26.48 24.64 32.78 32.26 10.43 51.97 50.72 50.34 51.41 52.05 
prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0640 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
rho              
N 296 296 221 221 296 296 62 296 296 296 296 296 
i 35 35 35 35 35 35 32 35 35 35 35 35 
Source: Author’s 
calculations. *** p <= .001 ** p<= .01 * p<=.05 Standard errors are shown below the coefficient in parenthesis 
 
 
The final table of the four, looks at the different openness variables with Tertiary sector FDI as 
the dependent variable. As shown in Table A3.6. Almost all of the models in this table have 
high Wald Chi-square values (all significant at the 1% level), except for Trade7 (which is 
significant, but only at the 90% level).  Trade3b and ln_TradeR4 are insignificant variables.  
 
Referring still to Table A3.6, Ln_TradeR13 and Trade3a are both significant variables, but 
whilst they both have negative signs, this has conflicting meanings. For ln_TradeR13, it 
suggests as a country liberalises trade (increased openness), Tertiary FDI would decrease.  
In the case of Trade3a’s negative effect, as a country lowers tariff rates on exports and imports 
(thus liberalising trade), this would result in an increase of Tertiary FDI.   
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Table A4.2.1 APTA (FE) method versus APTA (GLS) method, Total FDI. 
Macroeconomic Variables. Corrected 
Corrected for heteroscedasticity and/or serial correlation 
FE/GLS    1990-2010 xtreg, fe  and xtgls 
Sectoral FDI and Macroeconomic Variables   
    1 2 
Dependent Variables   APTA (FE) APTA (GLS) 
Independent Variables      
        
        
openness ln_TradeR4  -0.563 -0.0306 
    (1.096) (0.101) 
log REER2   0.367 -0.0420 
    (0.294) (0.187) 
real GDP growth  0.216 -0.00591 
    (0.146) (0.0101) 
P2   0.00531** 0.00663*** 
    (0.00159) (9.17e-05) 
Log GDP per capita  -0.104 -0.0249 
    (0.101) (0.0683) 
        
Constant   1.250 0.558 
    (5.632) (1.070) 
          
F   880.15   
Prob>F   0.0000   
rho   0.3295 0.7213 
N   75 46 
i     6 5 
Source: author’s calculations.   
*** p <= .01** p<= .05 * p<=.1   
Standard errors are shown below the coefficient in parenthesis 
 
When testing for serial correlation, there seems to be some evidence present when using 
either the ln_TradeR4 and ln_TradeR13 openness variables on Tertiary FDI. 
 
The APTA subset was run, using the GLS method after correcting for any heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation present in the Total FDI regressions (to compare against the EMC 
sample GLS model. As shown in Table A4.2.1). Using the GLS method - like in the EMC 
regressions – rather than the FE method resulted in weaker Openness Variable, but the sign 
remained negative. REER and GDP growth variables became negative, but remained 
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insignificant. The Inflation variable remained slightly positive, but increased significance. The 
GDP per capita variable weakened, but remained negative and insignificant. 
 
Table 4.2.2 Modified Wald Test for Heteroscedasticity (xttest3) 
xttest3 modified Wald test chi2(34) Prob > chi2 < 0.05% reject Heteroskedasticity  
1 total FDI 8765.16 0.0000 yes yes 
2 primary FDI 1.9e+05 0.0000 yes yes 
3 secondary FDI 10803.55 0.0000 yes yes 4 tertiary FDI 1872.00 0.0000 yes yes 
Source: Author’s own calculations  
Table 4.2.3 Test for Serial Correlation in the error structure (xtserial) 
xtserial Test for serial correlation F stat prob>F serial correlation 
1 total FDI 5.152 0.0297** yes 
2 primary FDI 14.792 0.0005*** yes 
3 secondary FDI 2.39 0.1317 no 
4 tertiary FDI 3.995 0.0539 no 










Table A4.3.1: EMC Total Sector FDI, uncorrected Control Variables (xtgls) 
Generalised Least Squares xtgls 1990-2010 Prior to corrections for Heteroscedasticity and Serial Correlation 
Sectoral FDI and Institutional Variables              
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dependent Variables   Total FDI as a share of GDP           
Control Variables ln_InfraISum2Mis Educ2nd EducTer  Corrup  NatResTotExProt OilResDum ln_InfraT 
         
         
openness (ln_TradeR4) 1.373*** 0.742** 0.779** 1.221 0.606* 0.884*** 0.780** 
   (0.431) (0.364) (0.353) (0.771) (0.332) (0.332) (0.331) 
log REER2 -0.268 0.218 0.0271 -0.257 0.191 0.516 0.533 
  (0.911) (0.877) (0.835) (2.794) (0.657) (0.675) (0.674) 
real GDP growth 0.000232 0.0152 0.00601 -0.154 0.0133 0.00743 0.00685 
  (0.0477) (0.0404) (0.0400) (0.104) (0.0385) (0.0386) (0.0386) 
P2 0.00527 -0.00829 -0.0348** -0.0271 0.00525 -0.00427 -0.000794 
  (0.0139) (0.0141) (0.0163) (0.0248) (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0111) 
Log GDP per capita -0.212 -0.554** -0.0738 -0.0371 -0.254 -0.0171 -0.338 
  (0.220) (0.245) (0.236) (0.476) (0.181) (0.196) (0.287) 
          
Qualitative Var. -0.222 0.0466*** 0.00511 0.411 -0.910*** 0.150 0.321 
  (0.199) (0.0107) (0.0101) (0.275) (0.196) (0.375) (0.248) 
          
Constant 2.548 0.205 0.724 -0.846 3.799 -2.667 -1.990 
  (4.850) (4.114) (4.058) (13.24) (3.542) (3.753) (3.453) 
          
Wald Chi2 16.19 33.23 17.45 9.34 37.60 13.28 14.82 
prob > chi2 0.0128 0.0000 0.0078 0.1555 0.0000 0.0388 0.0217 
Observations 213 265 233 72 302 314 313 
i 33 35 34 15 34 35 35 
AR(1) (p-value)         
AR(2) (p-value)               
Source: Author’s own calculations.        
*** p <= .01** p<= .05 * p<=.1         
Standard errors are shown below the coefficient in parenthesis           
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Table A4.3.2 Total FDI Modified Wald Test for Heteroscedasticity (xttest3) 
xttest3 modified Wald test chi2(34) Prob > chi2 < 0.05% reject Heteroskedasticity  
1 ln_InfraISum2Mis 1.9e+05 0.0000 yes yes 
2 Educ2nd 5476.48 0.0000 yes yes 
3 EducTer 36705.50 0.0000 yes yes 
4 Corrup 4421.54 0.0000 yes yes 
5 NatResTotExProt 5140.65 0.0000 yes yes 
6 OilResDum 10484.86 0.0000 yes yes 
7 ln_InfraT 7360.09 0.0000 yes yes 
Source: Author’s own calculations  
 
Table A4.3.3 Total FDI Test for Serial Correlation in the error structure (xtserial) 
xtserial  Test for serial correlation F stat prob>F serial correlation 
1  ln_InfraISum2Mis 2.833 0.1048 no 
2  Educ2nd 1.938 0.1735 no 
3  EducTer 0.408 0.5281 no 
4  Corrup 0.000 0.9828 no 
5  NatResTotExProt 5.111 0.0305 yes 
6  OilResDum 5.152 0.0297 yes 
7  ln_InfraT 5.246 0.0283 yes 
Source: Author’s own calculations  
 
 
Table 4.3.4 Primary FDI Modified Wald Test for Heteroscedasticity (xttest3) 
xttest3 modified Wald test chi2(34) Prob > chi2 < 0.05% reject Heteroskedasticity  
1 ln_InfraISum2Mis 4.5e+05 0.0000 yes yes 
2 Educ2nd 6.6e+05 0.0000 yes yes 
3 EducTer  82116.18 0.0000 yes yes 
4 Corrup  29629.04 0.0000 yes yes 
5 NatResTotExProt 59431.37 0.0000 yes yes 
6 OilResDum 1.6e+05 0.0000 yes yes 
7 ln_InfraT 6.7e+05 0.0000 yes yes 







Table 4.3.5 Primary FDI Test for Serial Correlation in the error structure (xtserial) 
xtserial Test for serial correlation F stat prob>F serial correlation 
1 ln_InfraISum2Mis 20.193 0.0001 yes 
2 Educ2nd 46.240 0.0000 yes 
3 EducTer  2.868 0.1007 no 
4 Corrup  8.720 0.0161 yes 
5 NatResTotExProt 14.484 0.0006 yes 
6 OilResDum 14.792 0.0005 yes 
7 ln_InfraT 15.056 0.0005 yes 
Source: Author’s own calculations  
 
Table 4.3.6: Secondary FDI Modified Wald Test for Heteroscedasticity, (xttest3) 
xttest3 modified Wald test chi2(34) Prob > chi2 < 0.05% reject Heteroskedasticity  
1 ln_InfraISum2Mis 1.2e+05 0.0000 yes yes 
2 Educ2nd 5725.98 0.0000 yes yes 
3 EducTer  10314.2 0.0000 yes yes 
4 Corrup  1.6e+05 0.0000 yes yes 
5 NatResTotExProt 8008.60 0.0000 yes yes 
6 OilResDum 16482.16 0.0000 yes yes 
7 ln_InfraT 4138.19 0.0000 yes yes 
Source: Author’s own calculations  
 
Table 4.3.7: Secondary FDI Test for Serial Correlation in the error 
structure, (xtserial) 
xtserial Test for serial correlation F stat prob>F serial correlation 
1 ln_InfraISum2Mis 11.976 0.0020 yes 
2 Educ2nd 1.700 0.2016 no 
3 EducTer  0.670 0.4198 no 
4 Corrup  2.396 0.1560 no 
5 NatResTotExProt 2.441 0.1281 no 
6 OilResDum 2.390 0.1317 no 
7 ln_InfraT 2.402 0.1307 no 







Table 4.3.8: Tertiary FDI Modified Wald Test for Heteroscedasticity (xttest3) 
xttest3 modified Wald test chi2(34) Prob > chi2 < 0.05% reject Heteroskedasticity  
1 ln_InfraISum2Mis 3975.71 0.0000 yes yes 
2 Educ2nd 6250.68 0.0000 yes yes 
3 EducTer  1796.44 0.0000 yes yes 
4 Corrup  1.7e+05 0.0000 yes yes 
5 NatResTotExProt 1607.32 0.0000 yes yes 
6 OilResDum 2281.62 0.0000 yes yes 7 ln_InfraT 1395.96 0.0000 yes yes 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
 
Table 4.3.9: Tertiary FDI Test for Serial Correlation in the error structure 
(xtserial) 
xtserial Test for serial correlation F stat prob>F serial correlation 
1 ln_InfraISum2Mis 2.306 0.1419 no 
2 Educ2nd 2.713 0.1093 no 
3 EducTer  3.395 0.0756 no 
4 Corrup  1.890 0.1992 no 
5 NatResTotExProt 4.045 0.0528 no 
6 OilResDum 3.995 0.0539 no 7 ln_InfraT 4.101 0.0510 no 




Table 4.4.1 Test for Serial Correlation in the error structure (xtserial) 
xtserial  Test for serial correlation   F stat  prob>F  < 0.05% reject  serial correlation 
1  total FDI  21.063  0.0059***  yes  yes 
2  primary FDI  2.742  0.1731  no  no 
3  secondary FDI  2.570  0.1842  no  no 
4  tertiary FDI  10.458  0.0319**  yes  yes 
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